2023年12月20日发(作者:宝马740l价格表)

JEL code: F35

COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS IN THE BALTICS

M. Peter van der Hoek and Yen Yee Chong*

*M. Peter van der Hoek is an Associate Professor of Economics at the Erasmus Public Law and

Economics Center (EPLEC) of Erasmus University in Rotterdam. Yen Yee Chong was visiting

Assistant Professor in Economics at Tallinn and Tartu Universities, Estonia, under the

Soros-funded Civic Education Project. He now works for DSL Consultants, London,

specializing in Emerging Markets and Information Systems. The authors gratefully

acknowledge useful data/suggestions they received with regard to this paper through

communications with:

Geoffrey Adams, (Agricultural consultant-PHARE), England.

Peter Ausden, Department of Trade and Industry, World Aid Section, Britain.

Charles Garrett, Know-How Fund, FCO, London, Britain.

Jackie Gent, Project Evaluations, Overseas Development Agency, Britain.

Tomas Gils?, journalist, Karlstadt, Sweden.

Gudrun Knutsson, NUTEK, Stockholm, Sweden.

Ene Kolbre, Dean of Economics, Tallinn Technical University, Estonia.

Lars Kristofferson, Stockholm Environmental Institute, Stockholm.

Ragnar L?fstedt, University of Surrey, Britain.

Ulo Mander, Department of Geography, Tartu University, Estonia.

Bob Maushammer, USAID, Estonia.

Frank Ryan, European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, London.

Charles Scott, Loyola College, MD, USA.

Basil Zavoico, IMF representative, Estonia.

In particular, Charles Scott provided us with much support throughout, while Ragnar L?fstedt

helped us a lot with initial Swedish contacts. Some of the data in countries of Estonia, Latvia,

Lithuania come from private interviews for which we are requested not to divulge personal

details. Other data in the fields of environmental science has been gathered by meetings and

discussions with economics staff in: the universities of Aarhus, Roskilde, Copenhagen,

Denmark; Royal Academy of Sciences, Sweden; Finnish Environmental Ministry, Helsinki.

We would like to thank the staff who are numerous and not explicitly mentioned who have

helped us with information. Among them are participants of the 42nd International Atlantic

Economic Conference held in Washington, D.C., October 10-13, 1996, where an earlier

version of this paper was presented. The sole responsibility for the paper, however, lies with

the authors.

Correspondence address:

M. Peter van der Hoek

P.O. Box 137

NL-3350 AC Papendrecht

Netherlands

Phone: 31-10-4081622

Fax: 31-10-4532912

E-mail: vanderHoek@

Abstract

After the upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Western

world has given considerable aid to the fledgling democracies. In this paper we draw a summary

from Baltic experience in the fields of educational programs, scientific and environmental

programs, and commercial projects in banking, taxation and energy. We analyze the motivation

and identify different possible effects of foreign aid. We signal possible inefficiencies arising from

the lack of coordination of foreign aid, deal with possible waste as being a form of loss in

cost-effectiveness, and address the policies followed by aid providing agencies. Finally, we suggest

ways that can help to achieve cost-effectiveness by assisting the donor and recipient in maximizing

benefits gained and possibly reducing costs. (JEL F35)

1. Introduction

After the upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Western

world has given considerable aid to the fledgling democracies. The Organisation for Economic

Co-operation and Development [OECD, 1996] survey of aid flows to Central and Eastern

European countries 1990-1994 showed total net official and private flows from bilateral sources

amounting to $81 billion and from multilateral institutions $26 billion. On an annual basis, total

receipts rose rapidly from $10 billion in 1990 to $31 billion in 1992, but declined over the

following two years to $18 billion in 1994.

For an eastern European country, the aid may even overshadow its own GDP. In the former East

Germany following reunification the aid from the western part exceeded the regional GDP of East

Germany.i The amount of foreign aid is smaller in the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and

Lithuania, but still represents a significant part of economic activity. For example, 1995 foreign

aid was $82 million in Estoniaii although it has only 1.5 million people.

In this paper we do not aim at carrying out a comprehensive empirical evaluation of all programs.

We have to point out the large amount of resources required to mount a comprehensive survey of

cost-effectiveness across all types of foreign-aid programs. We draw a summary from Baltic

experience in the fields of educational programs, scientific and environmental programs, and

commercial projects in banking, taxation and energy. We analyze the motivation and evaluate the

aid flows, a field in which relatively little work has been done so far.

Our goal is to present a framework for future evaluation studies. First, we identify motives that

underlie the aid to the Central and Eastern European countries. Second, we address the effects of

the aid flows. As in environmental aid \"there has been almost no evaluation of Western

bilateral-aid projects in Eastern Europe, e.g. their cost-effectiveness for a specific objective. This is

related to the fact that many countries, such as Sweden and Denmark, do not have clear

environmental strategies for their East European environmental aid programs, which leads to

inefficient use of aid funds\" [L?fstedt and Sj?stedt, 1995, p. 368]. In the Netherlands, the AR or

General Accounting Officeiii asked ministries to list policy evaluation studies carried out during

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1987-1989. The AR considered only half of the studies listed by the ministries to be policy

evaluation studies. In addition, less than a quarter of the reports analyzed by the AR appeared to

study policy effects, and thereby, present any measure of cost-effectiveness [Algemene

Rekenkamer, 1991, p. 71].

The OECD defines an evaluation as \"an assessment, as systematic and objective as possible, of an

on-going or completed project, program or policy, its design, implementation and results\" [OECD,

1992, p. 132]. Insofar as empirical evaluations have been carried out, these were usually done for

internal use. Other evaluations have been more project-specific as at such lower levels of detail, we

come up with good concrete data on the actual cost-effectiveness of projects in terms of cash

investments and pay-back periods on investments. One such area that evaluates effectiveness is in

the use of Swedish funds and manpower in the Baltic Environmentally Adapted Energy Systems

(EAES) program of the Swedish agency NUTEK (National Board for Industrial and Technical

Development). EAES project-effectiveness evaluation examples are Martinot (1995) and Blumberga

(1995).

Though there are difficulties and inadequacies of assessing operational cost-effectiveness

objectively, we analyzed our own directly-collected data [Chong, 1995], plus a sample of Baltic

cases in various sectors [Secretariat for Analysis of Swedish Development Assistance, 1994;

National Board for Industrial and Technical Development, 1995; European Bank for

Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 1994]. We then drew our conclusions from these cases

which we believe to be representative for the Baltics in their fields.

In order to assess the cost-effectiveness of programs, we need criteria for measuring costs and

benefits. We have come across very subjective and sometimes controversial measurements of costs

and benefits. Although we were not always able to exercise the American-style Freedom of

Information Act data access, we did manage to meet official bodies and individual contacts from

living and working in the Baltics during 1990-1996. This meant that we received direct data and

statistics, and we concentrated in areas where costs and benefits were either known (according to

pre-defined criteria) or concrete (observed and even measurable). Apart from financial costs we can

examine other costs. One view of costs [Martinot, 1995, pp. 2-3] included factors of direct

investment, intermediation, risk, avoided costs, financial repayment, and other costs (e.g.,

externalities or third party harm/injury, such as pollution). We can assume that there are benefits

that motivate donors to provide the relatively large sums of funds and resources available.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 addresses the motives underlying

foreign aid, both on the side of the donor and on the recipient\'s side. Section 3 identifies different

possible effects of foreign aid. In section 4 we signal possible inefficiencies arising from the lack of

coordination of foreign aid, while section 5 deals with the possibly resulting waste. Section 6

addresses the policies followed by aid providing agencies. Section 7 deals with procedures and

presents some recommendations to help achieve cost-effectiveness. Finally, in section 8 we present

some concluding remarks.

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2. Foreign Aid Motives

As a major Baltic \"player\", the EBRD sets overall goals: \"It is important to note that the

performance classifications of the evaluated operations are based on four strategic criteria: The

EBRD\'s additionality (other financing for the operation is not available on favourable terms); the

operation\'s transition impact, including environmental considerations; the company/project

performance; and the Bank\'s investment performance\" [EBRD, 1996a, p. 34]. As a nation, Sweden

in 1993 trebled its aid to SEK 1.12 billion ($170 million) to the Baltic countries, Poland and the

Russian oblasts of burg and Kaliningrad. But Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania got most of

the aid - even though their populations total about 8 million - making Sweden the largest Western

aid-donor in the region [Schori and Karlsson, 1993, p. A4].

There are many reasons for a foreign power to donate aid to the Baltic countries. Reasons cited,

for example, \"Sweden\'s aid policy towards the Baltic region is a mix of philanthropy and realism

and includes aid for economic, strategic and environmental purposes\" [L?fstedt, 1995a, p. 255].

Such assistance has been said to be motivated by the \"neighborhood interest\" of looking after one\'s

own backyard. This has included Baltic military border security equipment of patrol boats, radar,

all-terrain vehicles and technical help for improving the safety of Lithuania\'s Ignalina nuclear

reactor, which is a Chernobyl-type reactor. There are ECU 33 million ($42 million) available for

increased safety measures at Ignalina, which was strongly motivated by the fear of a nuclear

disaster coupled with the proximity of the European Union countries to the reactor site [EBRD,

1996a, pp. 39-40].

On the donor\'s side there are also different actors, including politicians, civil servants, private

consultants, and pressure or special interest groups. Basically, they may be moved significantly by

the same motives as actors on the recipient\'s side. This has manifested itself in the large amounts

of foreign aid donated by Sweden and Finland to Estonia, even though Estonia only has 1.5 million

inhabitants. Historically, these Western benefactors are concerned with the fate of the recipient

country. Sweden possessed Estonia and northern Latvia as colonies during the 16th and 17th

centuries. Finland is Estonia\'s strongest ally and relation in the Finno-Ugric linguistic family.

The self-interest of those donors involved does play a large role. For example, the old Swedish aid

agency BITS (being the National Committee for International Technical and Economic

Collaboration) was required by law to fund only Swedish firms and consultants (BITS became

subsumed into the larger aid agency, SIDA, in 1995). Local Western companies can therefore

derive profit from deliveries to the Baltic aid-providing agency. The high costs of employing

Western staff and using Western equipment drive up the total project costs; thus, it is not possible

to instigate low-cost Baltic programs (e.g., see Chong, 1993). On the other hand, it would not be

politically easy to win approval for a project that employs mainly lower-cost eastern European

labor and equipment. Thus, much of the foreign-aid budget is already \"ear-marked\" or \"tied\" for

Western firms and staff, with cost-effectiveness and helping the Eastern country bearing secondary

importance [L?fstedt, 1995b, p. 43].

Politicians may gain political support, for instance among émigrés from the recipient country.

Estonia has a large émigré population living in Sweden and Finland. Civil servants may also

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improve their position by administering an aid project. An \"institutional\" self-interest to reinforce

the position or power of the donor country in international politics may be an underlying motive

for the aid provided. Thus, Denmark provided up to DKK 160 million ($28 million) in

environmental aid to Eastern Europe, primarily Poland. This is because Poland is its largest

Eastern European neighbor, and most of the pollution in that Danish part of the Baltic sea

originates from the river Vistula, Poland. Once again, the aid is administered by the Danish

Environmental ministry with representations from the trade, labor and engineering associations.

Most aid investment goes to Danish manufacturing companies and consultants, with a third of the

total budget going to direct environmental investment and equipment in the targeted Baltic

countries [L?fstedt and Sj?stedt, 1995, p. 367].

Many actors play an important role on the aid recipient\'s side, including politicians, civil servants,

and private consultants. Each actor or group of actors may be ruled by different motives. First,

they may be stirred by the benevolent motive of serving the interest of the recipient country. It is

postulated that they want the best results for their country in terms of concrete benefits. Such

benefits are, for example, the improvement in water quality and a better sewage system instead of

Western analyses. This manifested itself in the complaint of the Latvian ex-Environmental

vice-minister that he preferred more Western aid as pipes for the Riga sewage system instead of

another pre-feasibility study [Bjerstr?m, 1992].

Second, the financial or career self-interests of the individual involved play a major role, be it of a

politician, a civil servant, or a private consultant. A politician may expect to gain political or

popular support by acquiring some aid, while he also may expect to gain benefits for his ministry

or for himself. A civil servant may improve his position by serving as the donor country\'s

counterpart and being responsible for the absorption of the aid. A private consultant has an interest

because the aid program opens up new opportunities for assignments and revenue.

An example of political and business self-interests is in the race to win the contract for the

rebuilding of the electricity generators in Narva, Estonia. The capital contract amounts to some

$100 million and carries a large element of prestige for all those who will work on it [Chong,

1995, p. 8]. But there is little expenditure for pollution-control and energy conservation projects

which are less politically-beneficial. These energy-conservation measures are more financially

cost-effective. The Ministry of Economy\'s Energy Conservation Center had an annual budget of

$10,000 (i.e., 0.01% of the new generators\' cost) but this agency was threatened with axing

[Chong, 1995, p. 8]. Estonian power demands fell 6% in 1992 after the fall of the USSR, giving a

reduction in SO2 pollution of 6% at zero additional cost [L?fstedt and Sj?stedt, 1995, p. 369]. But

we have to add that this comparison somewhat unfairly juxtaposes a once-off drop in demand with

a concomitant fall in energy output/pollution and is not an active pollution-reduction measure.

Since 1994, the Estonian economy has grown [The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1996, p. 4] and

the increased economic activity necessitates additional costs as pollution-reducing investments. To

illustrate the cost-effectiveness of such investments - as opposed to once-off reductions of pollution

and production resulting from a fall in economic activity - we refer to the FIM 24 million ($5

million) costs - paid 3/4 by Finland and 1/4 by Estonia - to install the latest scrubber technology at

one of these power plants. This resulted in a 0.5% fall in national SO2 pollution, i.e. $10 million

per percentage-point SO2 pollution decrease.

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Air quality is definitely poor in the Narva region of Estonia. \"Air pollution, particularly from SO2

and fly ash [comes] from thermal power plants and other industrial activities in North-East Estonia

as a result of the burning of oil-shale (with 1.6-2.4% sulphur), and also with NOx from traffic (the

majority of vehicles use leaded fuel and do not have catalytic converters)\" [Mander, 1996, p. 1].

There are limited signs of immediate improvement; certainly, enforced fitting of catalytic

converters and reduction in electricity usage would be more cost-effective for pollution reduction,

but these measures are unlikely to be politically acceptable. \"An enormous decrease in the

population\'s interest in environmental problems has occurred since the re-establishment of

independence\" [Mander, 1996, p. 1]. Thus, these particular cases suggest that the political and

business self-interests may be plausible explanations for driving large Western projects, as they

cannot be justified in terms of cost-effectiveness alone.

3. Effects

Effects of aid programs can be direct effects as concrete and immediate results of the program, for

instance, Riga city\'s much-needed overhaul of its sewage system. Latvia\'s welfare is improved by

a gain in technical skills and material assistance. The EBRD and the Latvian government agreed to

spend SEK 800 million ($121 million) to clean the sewage outlet from Riga to the river Daugava, a

waterway to the Baltic sea. The EBRD put up a loan of SEK 150 million ($23 million) and the

European Investment Bank (EIB) lent SEK 124 million ($19 million). Finland, Switzerland and

Sweden guaranteed loans on a total of SEK 77 million ($12 million). A third of Riga\'s sewage has

up to now gone totally untreated into the Daugava river and caused very serious long-term

environmental damage in the surrounding area. The sewage cleaning project will greatly decrease

the amount of pollution in the Daugava, Riga Bay and Baltic Sea [Tidningarnas Telegrambyra,

1996]. Another example is that the European Union\'s PHARE-program is notable in leaving

behind all the hardware that was purchased for the project. Thus, after the consultants have left,

cars, computers, etc. will stay in the recipient country. Larger hardware gains often come in the

form of loans instead of grants or donations, such as in large capital projects.

Indirect effects may occur in the medium/long-run as a by-product of the aid, for example, the

improved public transport or sewage may result in an increased productivity of the city\'s industries

and an increased attractiveness to investors. In addition, local people increase their knowledge and

experience partly from contact with the aid project. The British Know-How Fund (KHF) does not

give direct effects of capital accumulation in any hardware or equipment purchase but solely

provides technical assistance in terms of expert skills transfer. It has been involved in banking

skills training in Lithuania, which were demonstrably much needed in the wake of Lithuania\'s 1995

banking crisis. The sums invested in Britain\'s KHF Lithuanian banking program are small in

relation to other larger programs, i.e $150,000. The small size and the large element of local labor,

plus lack of any capital equipment injection, meant that this budget tended to be easier to monitor

and control. Essentially, this type of project ensured that the stock of human capital in the host

country increases as a result of the aid project.

The indirect effects of aid programs are difficult to measure and to identify. The causal relationship

between the indirect effect(s) and the original aid program may be vague or questionable.

Evaluations of aid programs are rare and they have been carried out with the (implicit) intention to

justify the policy pursued rather than obtain an objective assessment of the results. The US Agency

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for International Development (USAID), for example, issued a press release on July 6, 1996 of

USAID\'s Estonian success stories. This presentation may be consistent with the finding of the AR,

that in the Netherlands ministries use evaluations partly or solely to support their main policies

[Algemene Rekenkamer, 1991, p. 63]. However, USAID has compiled a comprehensive

assessment of its more than 60 activities in Estonia over the last five years. Since the full USAID

report was not yet available at the time of writing, we cannot judge to what extent it conducts an

accounting cost-benefit analysis or otherwise objectively looks at program results rather than

supports main US policies.

Riding on the back of its press presentation is the latent need to preserve good public relations,

both in the host country and at home. Nevertheless, it may be such that the self-interest motive is

perceived by tax-payers/voters to be too uncontrolled, or foreign-aid becomes too cost-ineffective,

that remedial action must be taken. An example is the creation of the Secretariat for Analysis of

Swedish Development Assistance (SASDA): \"The Swedish Government has appointed a committee

with the task of analyzing the results and effectiveness of Swedish development aid. SASDA\'s

point of departure is the aim of a better understanding of the mechanisms of development in order

to enhance the results and increase the effectiveness of aid in achieving the five goals set by the

Swedish parliament: increased resources, economic and social equality, economic and political

independence, the democratic development of society, and the long-term management of natural

resources and care of the environment\" [SASDA, 1994, front cover page].

4. Lack of Coordination

International aid is uncoordinated to a large extent and is offered by individual countries, groups of

countries or supranational bodies (such as the European Union), multilateral institutions (including

United Nations agencies, The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF),iv the

International Labour Office, etc. In addition, a large contribution comes from both national and

international charities. Several surveys of international aid flows are available, such as the OECD

survey covering aid to Central and Eastern Europe [OECD, 1996]. However, the surveys available

are not complete, do not cover total real spending, and do not contain evaluations of the effects.

In addition, there is no single institution that serves as coordinator of international aid programs.

The United Nations (UN) under an ideal environment seems the most obvious institution for such a

coordinating role, since by definition the UN cannot seek national or regional interests in providing

aid. Although to some extent it attempts to do so, and the UN Development Program (UNDP) does

play a key role, it does not have an official coordinating task as to international aid programs. Its

authority does not give it access to or control of the programs of other donor agencies, nor would

such control be appreciated by many agencies.

The lack of coordination of international aid gives rise to situations that leave room for

inefficiencies. Since there are many aid providers, it is possible that two different providers offer

the same aid without knowing each other\'s proposals.v This is a case of an imperfect market where

agencies \"compete\" against each other as part of the bid tender process. Competition between

agencies and their different proposals is good for the recipient, but this must be contrasted against

possible duplication of donors\' effort and waste. Competition is in the interests of the recipient

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nation as it may lower the project It can select the best tender at the best available terms

offered as Western countries offer different offset deals and \"sweeteners\", together with soft bank

loans or grants in order to clinch the contract in the Baltics. We have seen this particularly in large

capital projects such as the bids for the overhaul of the electricity power generators in the Narva

region, Estonia [Chong, 1995, p. 5].

Generally, aid-receiving countries may seem rather passive as to from whom they receive aid.

There have been cases where agencies took aid from those that made it available rather than from

those who were recognized experts in their field. For example, a former Soviet republic, planned

to introduce Value-Added Tax (VAT) and sought advice on how to implement it. An aid program

was requested from a country that has no experience with VAT. Indeed, in this particular case the

aid providing agency did not honor the recipient country\'s request precisely on the ground that

experts from countries applying a VAT seem more obvious

This phenomenon is even more likely when there are different groups in the same recipient aid

agency who have large amounts of local autonomy and are in contact with different donor groups

or consultants. Instead of working together on the same project, they come up with different and

competing solutions, e.g., how to generate electrical energy. The donors would consider this

inefficient, if they consider the duplicated effort in feasibility studies and contract tenders.

However, the recipient country may consider it efficient in that it can choose the advice that fits its

specifications best and provides the best terms for the mix of skills, equipment and loan/grant

offered [Chong, 1995, p. 6]. The recipient may also be said to receive the added prestige of twice

the amount of attention paid it by two (or more) agencies to fix one problem.

5. Foreign Aid Waste

We can look at waste as being a form of loss in cost-effectiveness. Measuring the extent of

inefficiency and waste is not easy per se as this can be largely influenced by our choice of

bench-marks. Thus, a project with lax or generous budgets and limits would tend to have met their

limits with ease. Those projects that run over-budget could have had their limits set unrealistically.

Therefore, we choose to point out differences across projects from recommended guidelines which

can indicate inefficiency and a breakdown in accountability, for example, because staff were not

able to exercise enough control over the project to avoid cost and time over-runs. Earlier problems

with administering aid to the Baltics and Eastern Europe led Sweden to come up with guidelines

for aid programs. This outlines the drive towards reducing wasted spending in Swedish-funded

pollution-control projects abroad. \"Joint implementation is a mechanism aimed at achieving

increased cost-efficiency. This means that for each Swedish crown the greatest possible

reduction-increasing or emission-reducing effect should be obtained\" [Swedish State Studies, 1994,

p. 3].

One source of waste comes from the use of bilateral aid using tied donor country products and

services, against multi-lateral aid where purchase of required goods and services is more open to

international Finland, one of the largest regional aid donors in environmental work, has a

large involvement in the Baltic area. The Polish Environment Ministry has suggested that Finnish

bilateral aid that stipulates purchase of goods from Finland results in more expensive goods, even

8

with a 30% government subsidy, than would be in an international tender [Zylicz, 1993].

For other evidence of waste, we have come across faculties in the Baltic state universities where

large amounts of money were spent in short trips by Western lecturers to deliver isolated single

lectures with little follow-up or impact on the final university education service. Other assistance

has included books, computers and telecommunications equipment sent to the people who were not

qualified to use them or unable to provide much-needed training to students. We recommend a

longer-term strategic partnership for universities whereby key staff can be transferred between

West and East for terms of about six months to transfer knowledge and skills [Van der Hoek and

Chong, 1995, p. 13]. These are cost-effective means of building teaching and research skills on

both sides, East and West.

We have pointed out several concrete examples of where waste or lack of cost-effectiveness can be

said to exist in programs. These are just a cross-section, but we need to go deeper with specific

cases of uses of program aid across all industrial sectors in the Baltics. It does emphasize that

foreign aid needs to be planned for the medium to long-term and coordinated with the recipients

and other donor agencies. Others have already proposed that there should be assessments to cut

down waste or sub-optimum performance in the programs, e.g., NUTEK, Sweden conducts

evaluation exercises for all its projects in the Baltics as routine procedure [Vares, 1995;

Blumberga, 1995; Pedisius, 1995]. Furthermore, these evaluations must be followed up \"[F]or

evaluations to be useful, they must be applied. Feedback to both policy-makers and operational

staff is essential\" [OECD, 1992, p. 132]. As obvious as this may seem, the AR found for Dutch

ministries that over half of the evaluation reports analyzed had not been demonstrably used

[Algemene Rekenkamer, 1991, p. 65]. The principles for evaluation of Development Assistance as

set out by the OECD [1992, pp. 131-138] have mainly been drafted for use by aid agencies for

evaluating their own activities. These guidelines are useful only as far as involved parties follow

this advice at all.

6. Donor Agency Policies

Foreign aid policies differ between donor countries and aid agencies. USAID has a much larger

budget with a large number of projects and operates a different policy from, say, the British

Know-How Fund (KHF) active in the Baltic states as part of operations handled by the Foreign and

Commonwealth Office (FCO). KHF also stipulates rules for projects such as the submission of the

project plan by the host countries\' ministries, not Western consultancies. Higher-cost projects need

to be submitted to a competitive tender process, with a contribution from the host country and the

contractor (\"matched funding\") required. This is a directive that Britain is unwilling to pay for a

project until it sees a commitment from interested parties [Overseas Development Agency, 1996, p.

28]. These pre-requisites may be waived for smaller projects or exceptional circumstances.

British overseas project proposals are evaluated by a central body, the Overseas Development

Agency (ODA) which compares projects submitted in order to select those that meet its criteria for

project desirability. These criteria depend upon the FCO view of regional political relations and the

needs of the foreign country, plus whether Britain wants to raise or lower its political and trade

status in the particular target country. This may seem an unwarranted intrusion by the FCO, but it

9

helps Britain to maintain a smaller and more cost-effective aid operation that suits Britain\'s needs

in maintaining foreign relations with developing Eastern countries. It is a case of foreign aid

meeting the foreign relations strategy controlled by a centralized body.

This is contrasted against the former Swedish example which was to have projects evaluated by

economists and officials in an agency such as BITS. Such staff did not have specific required skills

as in engineering, project-cost management accounting, environmental science etc., and therefore

BITS had to employ consultants from outside firms. This had the effect of driving up project costs,

or more accurately, the operational costs of BITS and the emphasis of spending a greater

proportion of the budget on pre-feasibility studies. Another unwanted result was that a

technically-skilled pool of in-house staff was not built up at BITS. This created poor results, among

other sectors, in the environmental engineering field. \"From a Western point of view, being

involved in Eastern European aid, especially bilateral, can be very lucrative. As there are not many

consultant firms working in Eastern Europe, there is a high chance that a given firm will have its

proposals funded (no international tenders), and there is a large amount of money in circulation.

Reports indicate that many consultants do not speak the language where they are working, they are

insensitive to the country\'s customs, spend too little time on site, lack environmental expertise, and

sometimes conduct studies that have already been carried out\" [L?fstedt and Sj?stedt, 1995, p.

368]. For these high-profile shortcomings BITS became taken over by the other Swedish aid

agency SIDA in 1995.

We can contrast this modus operandi of high-state expenditure and short-term approach of BITS

against the more private-enterprise funded approach of the British KHF and The World Bank. The

World Bank has promoted the Lithuanian bank-twinning project. This involved a project cost of

approximately $1 million over 18 months and linked the Lithuanian Ukio Bank in Kaunas with the

Dutch ING Bank and the Danish Unibank and the Lithuanian Vilnius Bank with the Dutch

ABN-AMRO Bank. No hardware is provided and project costs are shared by funds from The

World Bank, the Netherlands and Denmark. Skills transfer is concentrated in management and

control systems strategy, marketing, budget and accounting, treasury/securities. The

cost-effectiveness of this project is predicated upon a long-term commitment to business relations:

\"In a twinning project the partners work very closely together, and we learn a lot about each other.

That means we will also have less difficulties in doing business together in the future\" [The Baltic

Independent, 1996].

Similarly, the EBRD has invested ECU 2.3 million ($2.9 million) in the Estonian Savings bank

and ECU 2.5 million ($3.2 million) for Lithuanian Hermis Bank on an equity basis [EBRD, 1996a,

pp. 78-79]. The EBRD would only have done so when it is satisfied that the proposed projects are

suitable for their financial viability and regional economic goals after they have been evaluated

through the EBRD Bank Procedures [EBRD, 1996b, pp. 10-12]. The relatively high-profile input

enables the EBRD to exert a large element of influence on the Board of Directors and to implement

constant monitoring for a more appropriate business strategy. Furthermore, this equity move is

explicitly taken as a clear business-minded decision: \"When the EBRD takes an equity stake it

expects an appropriate return on its investment. It will have a clear exit strategy and will only take

a minority position\" [EBRD, 1996b, p. 4]. Estonian Union and Savings Bank, Latvian LZB,

Unibanka and D-L Banks, Lithuanian Hermis and Vilnius Banks have received ECU 63 million

($80 million) as credit lines to finance SME (small and medium sized enterprises) as part of the

EBRD strategy of regional economic development [EBRD, 1996a, pp. 76-82]. This move clearly

10

aims to stimulate economic growth and employment through generating several locally-inspired

small projects instead of a few large capital projects. For its smaller sponsored projects when

contract values are relatively low or local resource prices are lower than on the international

market, the EBRD favors Local Competitive Tendering, whereas for larger projects the EBRD

stipulates Open Tendering: \"It provides the greatest opportunity for competition and satisfies the

needs for economy and efficiency\" [EBRD, 1996c, pp. 6-7].

7. Procedures

The cases mentioned in section 6 are almost classic cases of the \"trade not aid\" dictum, and would

seem a more suitable platform for Baltic enterprises to build on, especially when they come to

compete effectively against Western enterprises. One financial institution that operates on this basis

is the EIB which lends up to ECU 3 billion ($3.8 billion) in 1994-1996 to Central and Eastern

Europe including the Baltic states. Its foreign aid is built on the provision of loans, not grants,

which meet its criteria. \"All projects must be economically justified, technically viable and

environmentally sound; in addition, productive sector investment must offer an adequate financial

return\" [EIB, 1996, p. 7].

We have examined some of the motives and effects of operating foreign-aid programs in the Baltic

region. There is a need to strike the \"right\" balance to satisfy interests of those involved. \"It may

be argued that donor interests should predominate because tax-payers in the donor country have the

right to a fair return on their tax money. Furthermore, the donor often has more advanced

knowledge about [environmental] problems and technologies and therefore `knows best\'. On the

other hand, it may be argued that the recipient has the right to the last word with regard to

domestic problems and policy choices. Familiarity with local conditions may give recipient

authorities privileged knowledge; they may also `know best\'\" [L?fstedt and Sj?stedt, 1995, p.

370].

We can suggest a common project set of procedures that assist the donor and recipient in

maximizing benefits gained and possibly reducing costs. These would raise the cost-effectiveness,

and thereby, the quality of the project. It is important to pre-screen or evaluate all projects before

starting so as to assess likely viability or performance. \"The quality of the operations at entry was

identified as one of the important ingredients for a project\'s success. Once disbursements are under

way on a fatally flawed operation little can be done to improve the success prospects\" [EBRD,

1996a, p. 34].

Foreign aid projects can be supported and coordinated under independent administrators to avoid

unnecessary duplication of effort and waste of resources between projects. This paper demonstrates

the need for foreign aid programs to be evaluated in tandem by both foreign aid donors and their

host country recipients; that evaluations are done to reduce potential waste and that we learn from

this process. Thus, we endorse the EBRD\'s statement about its project evaluations: \"There are two

basic objectives in project evaluation: to ascertain the results of the EBRD\'s portfolio of projects

and programmes, both intended and otherwise; and to determine whether there are significant

lessons to be learned from experience in order to ensure more successful operations\" [EBRD,

1996a, p.34].

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Ways that can help to achieve cost-effectiveness are:

for competing proposals or tenders.

e independent external skilled judges with technical understanding of the project for a more

balanced assessment of the \"best\" and most suitable solution.

trate that standard recommended operational guidelines have been followed, i.e.,

feasibility, tender bids competition, operational monitoring and milestones, post-project

evaluation. Example procedural steps are: Project proposal, Collateral submission, Project

appraisal, Financing, Tendering, Project monitoring, Project evaluation [EIB, 1996, pp. 7-9].

8. Concluding remarks

It is necessary to point out the difficulty of gaining data in a dynamic environment, where some of

the data could have politically-damaging results. We came across many cases where projects did

operate on a cost-effective basis, and where programs incorporated effectiveness evaluation

procedures. Nevertheless, there is proof of some inefficiency from our evidence of sample projects

in the Baltics. Standard operational procedures and audits serve to provide a structure for

promoting efficiency and monitoring of foreign-aid programs to gain cost-effectiveness.

We recommend the implementation of standard Project Operational Guidelines to reduce room for

such waste and inefficiency. We stress that both prospective donors and recipients should obtain a

better view of what is available in terms of solutions on the \"market\" by a tender process where

possible. We do recognize the need for political realism, and that it would be prudent for a

recipient country to accept an offer of international aid with strings attached (ear-marked aid),

where donor country staff and products are used as a return for tax payers\' money, rather than to

receive no assistance at all. However, a more business-minded approach should be adopted with

involvement of local enterprises in order to lower total budget costs and to know more about the

local requirements and conditions. We stress that both aid donor and recipient countries are likely

to gain from such procedures.

12

public expenditure as percentage of GNP of the area involved:

Former Western Germany

Former Eastern Germany

1991

48

123

1992

49

124

1993

48

113

Notes

Source: Central Planning Bureau, 1992, p. 43. (The original sources are: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Wochenbericht 26-27/92and HWWA, Konjunktur von Morgen 867).

we have ample experience in Estonia, we gathered some data pertaining to this country (with a population of 1.5 million). In 1995,Estonia received a total of at least EEK 1 billion ($83 million) grant aid from individual countries (Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,

Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and USA), the European Union, the Council of Europe, and theUN Development Program (source: Estonian Ministry of Finance). Obviously, even in the case of small countries like Estonia the aid is

scattered over a number of individual donor countries, international bodies, and international institutions.

avoid confusion with the American General Accounting Office (GAO) we refer to the Dutch General Accounting Office by using the

Dutch acronym: AR (Algemene Rekenkamer).

take the view that the IMF is not an aid provider. Rather, it maintains close relations with all of its members. Nonetheless, technical

assistance and certain loans provided by the IMF may be considered aid.

gained data in the financial consultancy services sector of foreign aid projects that we are not at liberty to divulge. These are from

individuals or agencies who gave information on the proviso that we did not make their data public. We respect their wishes. Frompersonal experience in Estonia we know, indeed, that foreign consultants from different donor countries have been working on similar

problems without knowing of each others activities or certainly, not cooperating with each other [Van der Hoek and Chong, 1995, p. 13;Chong, 1995, p. 5].

sly, this depends on the kind of aid. For example, nobody would rehabilitate the same power plant twice, but technical assistance is,

at times, accepted from two sources for the same need.

on information kindly provided by Robert J. Maushammer, USAID, Estonia.

term bilateral aid should be interpreted broadly, since it may not only pertain to aid provided by a single nation, but also by

supranational body such as the European Union, which allows only European sourcing.

13

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