2024年3月28日发(作者：东风启辰d60ev新能源车价格)
The World Economy
TheWorldEconomy(2011)
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.2011.01358.x
China’sForeignTrade:Perspectives
FromthePast150Years
WolfgangKeller
1
,BenLi
2
1
1
DepartmentofEconomics,PrincetonUniversity,Princeton,NJandDepartmentofEconomics,
UniversityofColoradoatBoulder,COand
2
DepartmentofEconomics,BostonCollege,
ChestnutHill,MA
UCTION
Ntheyear2007,China’simportsaccountedfor31percentofitsGDP,lar-
gerthanforsimilarlydevelopedIndia(25percent)andabouttwicethe
sizeofimportsforeitherJapan(16percent)ortheUnitedStates(17percent).
Recently,Chinahasalsobecometheworld’,business
delegationsfromallovertheworldcometoChina,oftenaccompaniedbytheir
politicalleaders,eof
China’tishPlenipotentiarySirHenry
PottingerannouncedafterBritain’svictoryoverChinaintheFirstOpiumWar
(1840–42)thatChina’spotentialfortradewassovast‘thatallthemillsof
Lancashirecouldnotmakestockingstuffsuf?cientforoneofitsprovinces’
(ChineseMaritimeCustoms(CMC)1933,p.39).Inhindsight,Pottingerwas
overlyoptimistic:ittooksome150yearsmoreuntilChinawoulddeliveronits
promiseforworldtrade.
ThetradehistoryofChinaisimportantforhowithasaffectedglobalproduction
ntemporaryanalystsview
China’srecentpre-eminenceprimarilyastheresultofthepost-1978reforms,per-
hapscontradictingtheideathatsustainedeconomicgrowthrequiressimultaneous
politicalreform.
1
Present-daydiscussionsonChinesedevelopmenthavemovedto
afocusonChina’scurrencyinterventionsthatkeeptheRenminbifromappreciat-
ingoronChina’sentryintotheWTOintheyear2001.
2
Wecontendthat
SeeRawski(1999),Woo(1999),andSachsandWoo(2000).TheruleoftheCommunistPartyin
China(CPC)beganintheyear1949,andstartingwiththeyear1978market-orientedreformswere
implemented.
2
SeeKrugman(2010)andCline(2010)onChina’scurrency;contrarianviewsareWei(2007)and
Reisen(2010).OnthetradeeffectsofChina’sentryintotheWTO,seeLardy(2002)andWhalley
(2006).
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.,9600GarsingtonRoad,
Oxford,OX42DQ,UKand350MainStreet,Malden,MA02148,USA.
1
I
853
854
,
understandingthefundamentalforcesbehindChina’sincreasinglydominantposi-
ngtothenineteenth
centuryandearlier,weareinabetterpositiontoidentifywhatis(andwas)China’s
‘normal’levelofforeigntrade,andhowtheselevelschangedunderdifferenttrade
regimes,from1840tothepresent.
ThelegacyoftheforcedopeningofChinabyWesternpowers,however,is
omesayitsloweddownhergrowth,othersholdthat
Chinawouldhaveactuallybene?tedfromtheincreaseintrade–haditnot
therviewisthatforeigntradeatthetime
paper,wetakethe?rststeps
toaddressingtheimpactoftheopeningofChinaontradeandeconomic
growthbyadoptingthelong-runviewofChina’roach
oninformationfromtheCMCservice,theorganisationsetupandrunbythe
WesttogovernChina’sforeigntrade,our?rstcontributionistopresentnew
evidenceonChina’sforeigntradeduringthetreatyportera(1842–1948).
China,itmustberemembered,wasafailingstateinthenineteenthcentury,
inthesensethattherulingQinggovernment(1644–1911)wasbythenincreas-
whichprohibitedopiumimports(inplacesince1729),wereforthemostpart
disregardedbysmugglersandof?ghacustomsapparatus
waspresent,corruptionalsomeantthatthestatedidnotorcouldnotcollect
signi?cantamountsofrevenuestofundpublicgoodsbecauselocalpower
competedwithof?revolutionisedthesystemof
rocess,
theCMCcollecteddetailedinformationontradenotonlyforChinaasawhole
butalsoforindividualportsoftradewithinChina.
Totheextentthatuncertaintyreduceseconomicactivity,thistransferofaWes-
terninstitutionmayincreasetradeandwelfare,andtheevidencepresentedbelow
lysisofChina’sforeigntradeduringthetreatyport
erayieldsanumberof?ndingsimportantforcurrentresearchininternational
,althoughthevolumeoftradeafterliberalisationwasnotlargeinthe
beginning,therewasaverynotableexpansioninthediversityofproductcatego-
riesandnewgoodsthatwereimportedintoChina,apointthatpreviousauthors
?ndthatthenumberofnewgoodsimportedbyChinagrew
byabout6percentperyearbetweenthe1860sand1940s,whichisabout50per
centfasterthanwhatthat?gurewasintheUnitedStatesbetween1970and2000.
Thisshowsthatproductvarietygainsarenotlimitedtohighlydevelopedcoun-
tries;infact,theymaybemoreimportantforpoorercountries.
Second,theexpansionofportsdidmorethanincreasegeographicaldiver-
rtant
?
ediaryinthisprocesswasHongKong,whichfunctionedasanentrepo
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CHINA’SFOREIGNTRADE855
TheimportanceofHongKongalsosuggestshigh?xedlearningcoststotrade
thatlargercountriesconductedlessoftheirtrade
tion,subsequent
toeverychangeinthetraderegime(ftertheopeningofnewCMC
treatyports),HongKong’stradeintermediationbecomeslessimportantover
time.
Furthermore,China’srecentpositioninworldtradeappearslessexceptional
therfactorsnodoubtplayarole,a
largepartofChina’,
itisareversionfromthedepressedlevelsofthepre-1978periodandisattrib-
ow
below,China’sshareofworldtradeattheturnofthetwenty-?rstcenturywas
,China’scurrentfootprintinworld
tradeismainlythatofaverylargecountryrapidlyindustrialising.
Wearenotthe?rsttostudytheopeningofChinafortradeinthenineteenth
bjecthasbeenlookedatbyanumberofauthors(Morse,1926;
Fairbank,1978),andthequestionparallelsmorerecentpapersbyBernhofen
andBrown(2004,2005)onJapan’thisperiod
isinextricablylinkedtothefactthatthistradecameaboutthroughaquasi-
colonialset-upimposedbyWesternpowers,re?ectingChina’sdiminishedposi-
ainearlierwritings,theforeign
intrusionisseeninanoverwhelminglynegativelight,andbyimplication,the
uthors
refernotonlytoopiumaddiction,butalsotomoregeneraleffectsofforeign
tradeindestroyingdomesticindustry.
3
Acounterargumentisthattheforeign
tradewassmallandtheextentofforeignpenetrationwasverylimited,cer-
tainlyinsuf?cienttoeffectivelycountertheforcesofChina’straditionalculture
andsociety,aswellasgovernment,toleadtoahigherrateofeconomicdevel-
opment.
4
Theimplicationoftheargumentbeingthatforeigntradewouldhave
carriedbene?tstoChina,butdidnotbecauseforeignin?uencewasultimately
ercase,theseauthorsrarelyprovideconclusiveevidenceon
tradethatsupportstheseclaims.
5
Byrelyingonthedetailedinformationonfor-
eigntradeintheCMCarchives,ouranalysisextendsthelargelydescriptive
accountsinMorse(1926)andFairbank(1978).
Forexample,Hou(1965)arguesthatforeigntrade(andinvestment)ruinedthedomestichandi-
craftindustries,disruptedagriculture,andforeign?rmsdidnotcompeteonalevelplaying?eld
withChinese?rms(p.1).Accordingtothisview,foreignimperialismintradesloweddownChina’s
economicdevelopment.
4
Dernberger(1975)providesasummaryoftheseviews.
5
Moregenerally,thequantitativeinformationthatstudiesonhistorictradeofChinapresenttends
tobelimited(ssicstudybyRemer,1926)andfromthesummariesbyYangandHou
(1931)andHsiao(1974).
3
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856
,
PreviousauthorshaveexaminedtheinformationcollectedbytheCMCser-
vice,althoughthusfarmostofthisanalysishasbeenundertakenbyhistorians
whohavewrittenindetailaboutmanyinstitutionalaspectsoftheCMC(Brun-
ero,2004,VandeVen,2004;Bickers,2008).
6
Intermsofeconomicanalysis,
Rawski(1970)hasshownthateventhoughtreatyportswereopenedtoforeign
merchants,WesterntraderscontinuedtorelyheavilyonChinesemiddlemen
(so-calledcompradors)cently,
MitchenerandYan(2010)havestudiedtheroleofforeigntradeforChina’s
wagesintheearlytwentiethcentury,arguingthatasurgeintradearoundthe
FirstWorldWarcausedadeclineintherelativeskilledwageinChina.
7
Our
workdiffers,?rst,inthatwecoveralongertimeperiod,frompre-1850until
today,whichallowsustoplacetheCMCeraintothebroadercontextofeco-
tion,wecontributetoabet-
terunderstandingoftheeconomicsoftradeintermediationandtheroleofnew
goodsforthewelfaregainsofinternationaltradebyfocusingalsoontheregio-
nalandcommoditydimensionsofChina’sforeigntrade.
8
Newgoodsareknowntobeimportantindrivingoveralltradegrowth
(HummelsandKlenow,2005).Ouranalysisoftherangeofgoodsthatis
traded,ortheextensivemargin,isrelatedtoFeenstra(1994)andBrodaand
Weinstein(2006).Thelatterauthorsshowthatalargefractionofwelfaregains
fromtradefortheUnitedStatesinthelatetwentiethcenturycanbeattributed
totheavailabilityofgoodsthatcouldnotbehadbefore.
9
Littleisknown,how-
ever,aboutthetradeeffectsofnewgoodsduringhistoricalperiods.
10
Toour
knowledge,therehasbeennoanalysisofnewgoodsandtheensuingwelfare
effectsforChinainthisperiod.
AnumberofstudieshaverecentlyanalysedotherkeyaspectsofChina’sfor-
eigntraderegimesince1978,highlightingthefactorsthataredrivingitaswell
ManyoftheseworksarerelatedtoaprojectatBristolandCambridge(/
history/customs/),whichhasalsostartedtomakeinformationontradeduringtheCMCperiod
er,CMCinformationhashelpedtobetterunderstandhowtrade
shapedthehistoryofeconomiessuchasTaiwan(Ho,1978;MizoguchiandUmemura,1988),as
wellasChina’sroleinthegreaterAsiancontextduringtheearlytwentiethcentury(Kose,1994,
2005).
7
WhilemostlyrelyingoninformationonpricesfromHsiao(1974),Brandt(1989)alsoemploys
CMCdataontradevolumesinhisanalysisoftheintegrationofChineseregionswiththeSouth
Asianricemarketfrom1870–1936.
8
`
sandCostinot(2010),Blumetal.(2009),Ahnetal.(2010),aswellasFeenstraandHansonAntra
(2004)arerecentanalysesofintermediationininternationaltrade.
9
Thearrivalofanewgoodthroughtradereducesitspricefromin?nitytosomething?nite,and
thewelfaregainsfromthisdependonwhetherclosesubstituteswerealreadyavailableornot.
10
HershandVoth(2009)estimatethecombinedgainsfromincreasesintea,sugar,andtobacco
coploy
informationonforeigntradetoestimatenewgoodconsumption,whichisusedtogetherwithother
datatobackoutpreferenceparameters.
6
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CHINA’SFOREIGNTRADE857
asitsimpactonothereconomies(BranstetterandLardy,2008;Amitiand
Freund,2010;Brambillaetal.,2010;HansonandRobertson,2010;Wangand
Wei,2010).Becausethefocusinthesestudiesisonarelativelyshortperiod,
theyplacelessemphasisthanwedoonnaturaladvantagesanddisadvantages
acrossregionsandthegradualriseanddeclineofcountriesintheworld.
11
ExceptionstothisareMaddison(2007)andChowandShen(2005).
12
Our
workdiffersfromtheirsinthatalthoughtheeraweexamineisfarearlierin
time,weareactuallyabletoprovideanevenmoredisaggregatedpictureof
foreigntradeofChinabyexploitingtheprimaryCMCsources.
tsectionsetsthestageby
summarisingwhatisknownfactsaboutChina’searlyforeigntradeaswellas
ion3ofthepaper,we
?rstdescribetheorganisationofforeigntradeinChinabeforepresentingkey
?ndingsonthearrivalanddiffusionofnewgoodsandtradeintermediationin
esisofChina’sforeigntradeinthe
post-1949eraisprovidedinSection4,whichemphasisesputtingChina’svery
ryaswellasadiscus-
sionofChina’sextraordinarilyhighleveloftradeopennesstodayisprovided
intheconcludingSection5.
’SFOREIGNTRADEBEFORE1842
nd
tradeinluxurygoodssuchassilk,slavesandspicestookplacewiththe
MediterraneanalongthefamedSilkRoadsincearound1,
fourth-and?fth-centuryCE,ChinesejunksappearedinSiam(Thailand),
Ceylon(SriLanka)andIndia,andbytheeighthcenturyCanton(Guangzhou)
hadestablisheditselfasthecentreofseagoingtradewiththeArabmerchants
orityofChina’searlytradebytheeleventh
centurywaswithrelativelyproximatecountries,mostlyinAsia.
13
Trade
routeswithJapanandKorea,aswellasthePhilippineIslands,wereestab-
lishedbythetwelfthcentury,andbytheearly1400saMingdynasty(1344–
1644)admiralcommandeeredexpeditionsfromChinagoingwesttoasfaras
11
ByshowingthattherelativelyrichregionsofChinainthelatetwentiethcenturywerealready
relativelyadvancedintheearlyeighteenthcentury,KellerandShiue(2007)arguethattheeffectof
thepost-1978reformscanbeeasilyoverestimatedduetonaturaladvantagessuchasaccesstowater
transport.
12
SeealsoLardy(1994,p.2)whodiscussesChina’scontributiontoworldtradeformostofthe
twentiethcentury.
13
Interregionaltrade?owsoverlandandseaconnectedChinawithSouthandSoutheastAsia,
CentralAsiaandtheIslamicworldaroundtheeleventhcenturyAD,accordingtoCurtin(1984).
SeealsoFindlayandO’Rourke(2007).
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858
,
China’ssubstantialtradewithAsiancountrieswasini-
tiatedbyChinaandconductedwellintothenineteenthcenturywithseagoing
Chinesejunks.
WhentradecostsalongtheSilkRoadincreasedbecauseofthedisintegration
oftheMongolempireaswellastheOttomanconquestofConstantinople
(1453)andAlexandria(1517),thisprovidedonemorereasonforEuropean
countriestoexplorethesearoutetotheEast:totradeinsilk,pepper,ginger
ear1517,thePortuguesewerethe?rsttoreachChina,
uropeancountries
withtradeinterestssoonfollowed–theSpanishreachedChinain1575,the
Dutchin1604andtheBritishin1637.
14
Thelattertwonationsestablisheda
lastinginterest,withtheDutchgainingaholdonTaiwanandBritishtraders
operatingoutofZhousan(inZhejiang),Xiamen(inFujian)andGuangzhou(in
Guangdong).
Theextentofinternationaltradewasnotonlyaffectedbythestateoftech-
nology(ships,navigation,etc.),butalsobythepoliciestowardstradefromthe
tIndiaCompany,forexample,heldamonop-
lythisrestricted
BritishtradewithChina.
15
Foritspart,whileChina’spolicytowardsforeign
tradeseesawedbackandforthbetweenbeingmoreorlessopenoverthecentu-
ries,onaverageitwasfairlyrestrictive,oftenallowingonlylimitedexchange
betweenspeci?cdomesticandforeigntradersinspeci?ntrade–
whenlegal–occurredgenerallyunderatributarysystem,underwhichforeign-
ersreceivedtherighttotradeinChinaforlimitedperiodsoftime.
China’sof?cialpolicytolimittradewiththeWesthasbeenattimes
expressedveryclearly.
16
YetforeigntradeinChinawascon?nedtoasingle
portasoftheendoftheeighteenthcenturynotbecausethegovernmentwas
blindtopotentialgainsoftrade,butbecauseitseemedthemostexpedientway
rtconsideredthepotentialbene?tsofforeigntradeto
besmallrelativetothedif?cultiesofmanagingthediscordbetweenforeigners
rridingconcernwasthattheforeign
traders,whowerenotalwaysengagedinpeacefultradingactivities,would
threatendomesticstabilitybyincitingunrest,disorderandpromotingpiracy.
Consideringthefatesofmanyunder-defendedpopulationsandterritories
duringofthisperiodofEuropeanempirebuildingoverseas,thiswasnota
14
SpainacquiredthePhilippinesin1565andannexedPortugalin1580,bothofwhichspurred
SpanishactivitytowardsChina.
15
Aderegulationactwaspassedin1694,butnoeffectivenewcompetitionemergedfromit.
16
Forexample,inturningdownarequesttoextendforeigntradeprivilegesfortheBritishbeyond
thecityofCanton,theQianlongemperorwrotein1793totheBritishKingGeorgeIIIthat‘strange
I[.]havenouseforyourcountry’smanufactures’.Thefull
lettercanbefoundat/core9/phalsall/texts/.
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CHINA’SFOREIGNTRADE859
estrictionsinChinawerethusemployed
toachievedomesticpolicygoals.
17
WasthereevidenceforstrongdemandforforeigngoodsinChina?James
Matheson,apartnerinJardineMatheson&Co.,oneofthetoptrading?rmsin
Asia,remarkedin1819afterapublicauctionsaleofLancashirecottonpiece
goodsthatalthoughitwaswellattendedbynumerousdealers,theshirtings
wereimpossibletosellbecausetheyappearedtobeinferiorimitationsofa
asthe1830s,Mathesontradersreportedthatthe
Chinesenativenankeencottonclothwassuperiorinqualityandcostcompared
toManchestercottongoods.
18
WithoutasuitablecommodityforexporttoChina,silver(whichhadtobe
minedintheAmericas)wasusedtopurchaseChinesesilk,porcelainandtea.
InanincreasinglymercantilistEurope,thisgavecauseforconcern,andthe
Chinesedemandforopiumasarecreationaldrugslowedthisdrainofspecie.
OpiumwasmostlyexportedfromBritishIndiaandsmuggledintoChinasince
ghenforcement
wasweakandsmugglingwasrampant,thebanontheopiumtradealsoepito-
misedthesentimentofWesterntradersthatChinarestrictedtheentryoffor-
eigngoods.
19
Whenin1839,anewlyappointedChinesecommissioneracted
relativelyforcefullyindestroyinganillegalopiumshipmentintoChina,Britain
resortedtomilitaryaction,beginningtheFirstOpiumWar(1840–42).The
hmilitaryforcestookCanton,movedupthe
coastandalongtheYangtzeRiver,capturedShanghaiandeventuallyreached
theGrandCanal,onwhichprovisionsweresenttothecapital,andthusin
effectthreateningBeijingitself.
TheTreatyofNanjing(1842),whichChinawasforcedtosign,stipulated
thatanindemnityhadtobepaidascompensation;inaddition,HongKongwas
er,foreignnationalshadtherighttoresidenceandto
ownpropertyintreatyports,andwhilelivinginChinatheyalsoweresubject
foreigntrade,thetreatyabolishedthetraditionaltributarysystem,liberalised
thehighlyregulatedCo-HongtradingsystematGuangzhouandopenedaddi-
tionalports(initiallyonlyfour)utieswerelimitedto5
asnotmentionedinthetreaty,implying
ter,theUnitedStatesandFrance
concludedsimilartreatieswithChina,theTreatyofWanghiaandTreatyof
Whampoa,respectively.
17
Forexample,inthe1660stheQingprohibitedmerchantjunkstogoabroadandevacuatedall
populationslivingnearthecoastofSouthernChinatosubduearebelliononTaiwan.
18
Greenberg(1951,p.2).
19
TheabolitionoftheEastIndiaCompany’smonopolyontradewithChinain1834exacerbated
thesituation,becauseitledtomoreWesternentryintheChinatrade.
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860
,
NDERTHETREATYPORTSYSTEM(1842–1949)
rgingInstitutionsandOrganisation
WhiletheTreatyofNanjingdidawaywithcentralelementsofChina’sfor-
eigntradesystem–inparticularthenotionthattradewaspartofthetributary
systemandthatCantonwastheonlyportopentotrade–initially,theChinese
r,
witharelativelyweakcentralgovernmentwhoseauthoritywaserodedafterthe
OpiumWarevenasitwaspreoccupiedwithsuppressingdomesticuprisings(in
particulartheTaipingRebellion,1844–60),foreigntraderevenuecollectionfell
ocalof?cials
wereill-equippedtohandlethelargervolumeoftradecomingin,andforeign
ontrary,paymentof
tradetaxeswasamatterofbargainingpower,andrifewithcorruption.
20
ThecreationoftheCMCServiceemergedoutofthisvacuumofpower.
21
The
CMCwasfoundedin1854bytheforeignconsulsinShanghaitocollectmaritime
tradetaxesthatweregoingunpaidbecauseoftheinabilityofChineseof?cialsto
ghtheCMCwasnominally
underthejurisdictionoftheChinesegovernment’sForeignOf?ce(Zongliyamen),
inpracticeitoperatedunderthemanagementofforeignpowers,anditsupperlevel
lly,staffweremostlyBritish,althoughotherWestern
CMCpositionanddirectorofitsoperations,was
calledtheInspector-General(IG),whoworkedsidebysidewithhisChinesecoun-
terpart,calledtheSuperintendentofCustoms,whooversawthecollectionoftrade
taxesfromtheso-callednativetrade,thatis,fromChinese-ownedjunks.
Earlyon,oppositiontotheCMCcame,?rstofall,fromforeignconsuls
er,
foreignmerchantsinitiallywereopposedtotheCMCbecausenowtheyhadto
dealwithcustomsformalitiesthatbeforewereleftintheirentiretyto(Chinese)
onlyacoupleofyears,however,foreignbusi-
nessmenhadcometoprefertheconsistentandpredictablecustomstreatment
bythenewCMCsystem,andovertimethefrictionsbetweenconsulsand
CMCof?cialsbecamelesssevere.
22
20
tishConsulofShanghai
estimatedinoneyearthatthelossoftariffrevenueinShanghaiwasatleast25percent,and
complainedthat‘twoorthreesleepymenialsat$5or$6amonth’werethesolemeansexistingfor
thecollectionofduty,withwhichhewasboundbytheTreatyofNanjingtocooperate;(CMC
1933,p.81).
21
TheServicewascalledImperialMaritimeCustomsServiceuntil1912.
22
Forexample,in1857theBritishConsulreportedthat‘thefeelingoftheforeignmerchantis
generallyinfavouroftheforeigninspectorshipsystem,foritplacesallonanequality’(CMC1933,
p.81).
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CHINA’SFOREIGNTRADE861
TheChinesecentralgovernmentnaturallyresentedthelossofsovereignty
thatcamewiththeTreatyofNanjing,buttheintroductionoftheCMCalso
substantiallyincreasedthenettariffrevenuesitreceived.
23
LocalChinese
governmentof?cialsprobablysustainedanetdeclineinbene?tsastheCMC
reducedtheirabilitytowithholdrevenuesfromthecentralgovernmentand
er,smugglers,piratesandadventurerssawtheirprospects
ofgaindiminishedwiththearrivaloftheCMC,especiallybecauseovertime
theCMCextendeditsresponsibilitiestoincludeanti-smugglingoperations.
Later,theCMCalsoexpandeditsinvolvementintopostaladministration,
coastalpolice,harbourandwaterwaymanagement,andweatherreporting.
FromthepointofviewofWesternpowers,theestablishmentoftheCMC
notonlybroadenedtheirpoliticalin?uenceinChinabutalsoensuredthat
Chinawouldhavethemeanstopaytheindemnitiesimposedonitafterthe
FirstandSecond(1856–60)ormationderivedfromthis
systemwassocrediblethatChinawasevenabletoputthetariffrevenuedown
ascollateralagainstwhichitcouldborrowfromabroad.
24
Anothermotive,
arguablythemostimportant,wasthattheWestwantedtosupporttheexpan-
sionofcommercialexchangebetweenChinaandtheirowncountriesandthat
meantamoreopenandconsistentChinesesystem.
TheCMCwasresponsiblefortheexaminationofcargo,preventionofsmug-
gling,theassessmentoftreatytariffsonexports,importsandcoastaltrade,
inal
tariffwas?xedtoyieldarateofapproximately5percentadvalorem;how-
ever,overtimetheeffectiveratewasoftenlower,around3percent,because
jurisdictionextendedto‘foreign-type’vessels,in
particularsteamships,whetherownedbyforeignersorbyChinese,andto
unksownedbyChinesewerehence
coveredbythenativeCustoms,onwhichthereisalmostnoinformation,the
successofsteamshipsoversailboatsinthesecondpartofthenineteenthcen-
turymeantthattheCMCwasresponsiblenotonlyforvirtuallyallofthedirect
tradewithforeigncountriesbutalsothelargemajorityofcoastalandriver
tradewithinChina.
Therewere?veChineseportsopenforforeigntradein1842pertheTreaty
ofNanjing,elevenmorewereaddedafterChinawasdefeatedintheSecond
OpiumWar(1856–60)throughtheTreatyofTientsin,andmorewereadded
overtime(mostlybeforetheturnofthecentury).TheCMCdidnotestablish
23
Thelong-termCMCdirectorRobertHartestimatedthatwhileunderthenativesystemthecosts
oftariffcollectionwereratherabovethanbelow100percent,undertheCMCatShanghaicosts
wereonlyaround2percentoftherevenues(CMC1933,p.81).
24
WhileChinacollectedwithoutdoubthighertariffrevenuesduetotheintroductionoftheCMC,
itisnotentirelyclearwhethernetofpayingforthewarindemnitiesanyofthatadditionalrevenue
wasleft.
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862
,
customsstationsinallports,butfocusedontheportsthatwereimportantfor
foreigntrade.
25
ThegeographicalproliferationofCMCportsovertimeyields
-
ally,themoreimportantportsareopenedrelativelyearly,whichmeansthat
theopeningoftheCMCcustomsstationinKowloonintheyear1886,virtually
allofChina’sforeigntradewascovered.
26
InformationcollectedbyCMCcustomsof?cialsincludesboththevalueand
includestradewithinChina,forexamplethenumberofcottonshirtingsthat
were?rstimportedbyShanghaiandthenre-exportedtootherChineseregions
alsocollecteddataonthetonnageofforeign
ships,becausethiswasneededtoassesstonnagedues.
TheCMCdatacollectionsystemunderwentanumberofchanges,inpart
owingtochanginginternationalpractice,andinpartowingtostructuralchange
oftheeconomy.
27
Thisistobeexpectedoveralongperiodofcloseto
90years–lityofthedatacollectedbytheCMCisgen-
aareinternallyconsistentandgenerally
matchesupwellwiththecorrespondingtradedataforthesame?owfrom
ynotbesurprisinggiventhatthetypicalforeignCMC
employeewashighlyskilled,beingagraduatefromarenowneduniversity,
suchasCambridge,Harvard,OxfordorYale.
’sOverallForeignTrade
WebeginbysummarisingChina’soverallforeigntrade,whichprovidesa
acome
1showstheevolutionof
China’saggregateforeigncommoditytrade.
28
,
fortheperiodshownChinawasmorelikelytohaveatradede?citthanatrade
Forexample,bytheyear1915therewere92treatyportsbutonly48ofthesemaintainedaCMC
tiontoportsopenedbyinternationaltreaties,therewereportsopenedbythe
Chinesegovernmentunilaterallybutwhereforeignerscouldnotreside,aswellas‘portsofcall’
whereforeignsteamerscoulddock.
26
KowloonwasimportantfortradewithHongKong,beinglocatedoppositetoHongKongIsland.
27
Asanexampleoftheformer,in1904theCMCswitchedfromreportingtradeinmarketvalues
tocost,insurance,andfreight(cif)valuesforimportsandfreeonboard(fob)valueforexports.
Structuralchangetriggeredseveralchangesinthegoodsclassi?cations,bothnationallyaswellas
attheleveloftheindividualport.
28
ReportedarenominalvaluesofHaekwanTaels,
adjustmentshavebeenmadeforterritorialchanges,forexampleManchuria,whichbecamepartof
ortspresentalsointernationalexchangeratestotheworld’smajorcurrencies,
nthegrapharetotalimports;afractionbetween1and5percentof
thesewerere-exportedfromChinatoothercountries.
25
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CHINA’SFOREIGNTRADE
FIGURE1
China’sForeignTrade,1865–1940
Imports
2,000,000
Exports
863
1,500,000
H
a
e
k
w
a
n
t
a
e
l
s
(
0
0
0
s
)
1,000,000
500,000
0
0
surplusinitscommoditytrade,thedifferencetobecoveredbybullionorinter-
,thevolumeofChina’soverallforeigntradeisrelatively
ards,theevolutionofhertradeisrather
forthecollapseintradeintheafter-
mathoftheGreatDepression,therearenomajordeviationsfromalinear
trend,andtheaveragegrowthrateofbothimportsandexportsisabout5per
substantiallylowerthaninthemostrecentpast;between
theyears2000and2008,thegrowthrateofChina’sforeigntradewasabout
18percentperyear,onotesthattheimpactof
theFirstWorldWaronChina’eEuropean
countries’tradestronglydeclining,thisisconsistentwiththeideathatChina
gainedmarketshareinworldtradeduringthisperiod.
29
yComposition
TurningtothecompositionofChina’sforeigntradeacrosscountries,we
analysethenineteenthandtwentiethcenturiesseparatelybecausetherewere
29
MitchenerandYan(2010)emphasisetheimpactoftradeonChinesefactorpricesduringthis
period.
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
864
,
TABLE1
AverageTradeShares,1865–1900
Imports
HongKong
GreatBritain
BritishIndia
Japan
USA
ContinentalEurope
Othercountries
%
41.36
24.82
18.23
5.80
2.65
2.31
4.84
Exports
GreatBritain
HongKong
ContinentalEurope
USA
Russia
Japan
Othercountries
%
31.65
26.94
11.86
11.07
5.82
4.93
7.73
1showsChina’smaintradepartnerson
boththeimportandtheexportsidebetweentheyears1865and1900.
?
ttrade)isTheroleofHongKongforintermediatingChina’strade(entrepo
mallfractionofChina’simportsfromHongKongare
producedinHongKong,andanalogously,onlyasmallpartofChineseexports
1quanti?esthisforthenine-
teenthcenturyatabout40percentforChina’simportsandalmost30percent
etheultimateoriginanddestinationofChina’strade
throughHongKongisnotknownforallyears,thefollowinganalysisnetsout
?
returntoChina’sentrepo
Figure2ashowsthecompositionofChina’simportsbetween1865and
gestsourcesofimportsearlyonwereGreatBritain,togetherwith
BritishIndia,withabout90percentofChineseimportsin1870(notthrough
HongKong).TheimportanceofIndiadeclinesovertime,whichisinpartdue
mportsourcesout-
sidetheBritishEmpire,thereisprimarilyJapan,anditsshareofChina’s
stillonlyabouthalfofChi-
na’ternsourcesotherthanGreatBritain,
importsfromtheUnitedStatesby1900arealmosttwiceaslargeasthosefrom
ContinentalEurope.
30
TheexportsideofChina’nstoryhere
isthatwhileChinaexportedprimarilytoGreatBritainatthebeginningofthe
periodaround75percentofthe(non-HongKong)trade,by1900theBritish
?ipsideofthisisanincreasingimportanceof
exportstoContinentalEuropeandmoreexportstoJapan.
31
Incontrastto
imports,IndiaisnotamongthemajorChineseexportdestinations,inpartdue
30
Here,tethatwehavedropped
theremaindertradesharethatbringsthetotalto100percentforreadabilityinthisandthefollow-
ing?gures.
31
TosomeextentthisisbecauseChinesegoodswentincreasinglydirectlytoFranceorGermany
insteadoftoLondon?rst.
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
CHINA’SFOREIGNTRADE
FIGURE2
China’sForeignTradebyCountrybetween1865and1900.(a)Imports;(b)Exports
(a)
0.6
865
0.5
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
h
a
r
e
n
e
t
o
f
H
o
n
g
K
o
n
g
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
18651870
Great Britain
5
Japan
1890
USA
18951900
British IndiaContinental Europe
(b)
0.8
0.7
E
x
p
o
r
t
s
h
a
r
e
n
e
t
o
f
H
o
n
g
K
o
n
g
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
18651875
USA
1890
Russia
1895
Japan
1900
Great BritainContinental Europe
er,
Russiaduringthistimeaccountsforasigni?cantportionofexports,whileitis
notimportantforimports.
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
866
,
TABLE2
MajorSourcesofChineseImports,1900–46
%
Japan
USA
GreatBritain
BritishIndia
Germany
Java(DutchEastIndies)
FrenchIndo-China
Russia(SovietUnion)
Belgium-Luxemburg
Singapore
Australia
Othercountries
24.51
22.05
17.02
9.65
4.19
2.91
2.39
2.10
1.85
1.56
1.25
10.53
Withtheturnofthecentury,anumberofadditionalcountriesbecame
importantinChina’strade;Table2showsthebreakdownofChina’simports
for1900–46.
Duringthe?rsthalfofthetwentiethcentury,Japanwasthemostimportant
sourceofChineseimports,followedbytheUnitedStateswhileGreatBritain
hadfallentothirdplace.
32
Beyondthelevelofoveralltrade,thenatureof
goodsimportedfromthesecountriesdiffered,withGreatBritainandtheUSA
exportingrelativelymoremachineryandotherproducergoodsthanJapanto
?cantamountsoftradewerealsoimportedfromarangeofother
proximatesourcessuchasDutchEastIndies,FrenchIndo-China,Singapore
heContinentalEuropeancountries,therelativelyearly
industrialisers,GermanyandBelgiumweremoreimportantthanItaly,for
l,whiletherelativeimportanceoftradewiththeBritish
Empirehaddiminished,theevolutionofChina’stradepatternswassmoothly
transitioningalongthefoundationslaidduringthenineteenthcentury.
ExaminingChineseimportpatternsfortheearlytwentiethcenturyovertime
indicatesthatJapan’srolechangedsigni?3a
showsthatitssharerosefrom20percenttocloseto40percentbetween
1915and1925beforefallingdrastically–closetozeroattheendoftheSec-
ondWorldWar.
33
Theimpactofthewarisalsore?ectedinthereducedshare
forGermany,whichwasalsoamongthelosingpowersoftheSecondWorld
tedStates,however,hadbecomemoreimportantasasourceof
32
Table2showsthepatternsofimportsdirectlyintoChina,nettingoutthetradethroughHong
Kong.
33
TosomeextentthedeclineinJapan’simportanceistheconsequenceofterritorialchanges;
Japan’soccupationofManchuriafrom1931onwardsloweredinthissense,China’sforeigntrade
withJapan.
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
CHINA’SFOREIGNTRADE
FIGURE3
China’sForeignTradebyCountry,1905–46.(a)Imports;(b)Exports
(a)
0.6
867
0.5
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
h
a
r
e
s
n
e
t
o
f
H
o
n
g
K
o
n
g
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
19051910
USA
(b)
1915
Japan
6
FranceGreatBritainRussia (Soviet Union)
0.6
0.5
E
x
p
o
r
t
s
h
a
r
e
s
n
e
t
o
f
H
o
n
g
K
o
n
g
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
19051910
USA
1915
Japan
6
FranceGreatBritainRussia (Soviet Union)
imports,eventhoughthedramaticincreaseoftheUSshare(tomorethan60
percent)istosomeextentbecauseitwastheonlymajorcountrywhoseecon-
omyhadnotbeendestroyedthroughtheSecondWorldWar.
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
868
,
ThechangingimportanceofChina’sexportdestinationsisshowninFigure
tedStatesaccountsformoreandmoreofitsexportsduringthis
period,’simportancepeakeddur-
i
Britain’ssharehoversaround10percentthroughoutthisperiod,andinthis
wayitremainsamajordestinationforChinesegoods,incontrasttoother
Europeancountries,salsoarelativelyhighfractionof
Chineseexports,about25percent,goingtocountriesotherthanthoseshown
asmuchasignofChina’ssuccessinpenetratingnew
marketsasofincomegrowthinanothersetofcountries.
ingChinawithOtherCountries
Atthebeginningofthetwentiethcentury,tradestatisticsformanyother
ereforeusefultoexamineChi-
na’reshown
inTable3.
34
Chinaaccountedforabout2percentofworldtradefrom1913to1938,with
llseebelow,ittookalargepartofthetwentieth
ingChinawith
othercountries,ithadaboutthree-quartersoftheforeigntradeofJapanand
prisingly,duringthisperiodChina’s
foreigntradefellfarshortofindustrialisedcountriessuchasGreatBritain,the
UnitedStatesandGermany.
Table4showshowthesetradesharescomparewithpopulationandGDP
,China’sshareofworldtradeissmallerthanits
,however,isalsotruefortheUnitedStates,Japan
andIndia,er,ifwefocusonthesimilarly
developedIndia,theratiooftradetopopulationforIndiais1=5whileitis
1=ametime,itisdif?culttoconcludefromthisthatChi-
na’sforeigntradewasunusuallysmall,becauseforagivenworldpopulation
foreigntradeisboundtofallwiththesizeofacountry’sdomesticpopulation,
andChina’swasnearly50percentlargerthanIndia’satthistime.
35
Tosummarise,aftertheOpiumWars,BritainandothermajorEuropean
r,bytheearlytwentieth
century,theregionalemphasiswasalreadystartingtoshifttowardsother
34
FiguresforChinaarefromtheCMCreports,everysimilartothose
reportedintheStatisticalYearbooksoftheLeagueofNation,onwhichthe?guresfortheother
countriesarebased;seeLeagueofNations(1940).
35
Wetakethisissueupagainintheconcludingsection.
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
CHINA’SFOREIGNTRADE869
TABLE3
WorldMerchandiseTrade,sPlusImportsasShareofWorldTotal(%)
CountryYear
1913
China
GreatBritain
USA
Japan
BritishIndia
Germany
1.88
15.24
11.15
1.79
3.60
13.12
1925
2.30
14.90
14.31
3.07
3.59
8.00
1930
1.83
13.44
12.61
2.62
2.87
9.65
1938
1.98
13.90
10.70
3.20
2.50
9.20
2.00
14.37
12.19
2.67
3.14
9.99
Mean
TABLE4
Trade,GDPandPopulation1913(InPerCentoftheWorldTotal)
ForeignTrade
China
GreatBritain
UnitedStates
Japan
India
1.88
13.24
11.15
1.79
3.60
GDP
8.83
8.21
18.92
2.62
7.47
Population
24.38
2.55
5.44
2.29
16.94
Notes:
GDPandpopulationdataarefrom/MADDISON/ntrade,fromTable3.
countries,thereasonmayhavebeenattrib-
utedtothemixofcommoditiesthatweretraded.
ityStructure
arlyyears,the
singlemostimportantimportwasopium,witharound37percentinthe
year1870,beforeitsimportancedeclined,duebothtoanincreasein
domesticproductionontheonehand,andontheother,increasinglyeffec-
tivedomesticandinternationallawsthatby1917bannedbothdomesticand
manufacturesaccountedforaround30percent
ofallimportsuntil1920,whilewoollenmanufacturesimports,whichnever
caughtonverymuchinChina,startedtodisappeararoundtheturnofthe
century.
Chinabecameariceimporteraround1890,andthisaccountsonaveragefor
7percentofChina’reofmetalsandmineralsisquite
stable(around6percent),whilemachineryisimportedinsubstantialamounts
’simportsbecamemorediverse,andtheshare
ofproductsnotexplicitlyshowninFigure4aisrisingovertime.
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
870
,
FIGURE4
China’sForeignTradebyCommodity,1870–1940.(a)Imports;(b)Exports
(a)
40
35
30
25
Opium
Cotton
manufacturing
Woollen
manufacturing
Metals and
minerals
Rice
Sugar
Cigarettes
Kerosene
5
Machinery
0
18701940
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
(b)
20
15
10
50
45
40
35
30
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
25
20
15
10
5
0
18701940
Silk
Tea
Sugar
Beans & beancake
Raw cotton
Hides & skins
Vegetable oils
Seeds
Egg products
Wool,
sheep & camel
Coal
Ontheexportside,theinitiallydominatingcategoriesareteaandsilkproducts,
accountingforabout70percentintheyear1870(seeFigure4b).Wealsosee
thattherelativeimportanceofteadeclinesfasterthanthatofsilk,althoughit
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
CHINA’SFOREIGNTRADE871
productssuchashidesandskins,butalsoores,minerals,andcoal,aswellasseeds
theyear
1910,Chinastartedtoexporttextileproductsinsubstantialamounts,andby1940
textileproductsaccountforabout10percentofexports.
Summingup,Chinatradedmostlycottongoodsandopiumforteaandsilk
beforeimportingabroaderrangeofproduceraswellasconsumergoodsby
theearlytwentiethcentury.
iveMarginofTrade
WenowshowthatChina’snewgoodsmargingrewsubstantiallyduringthe
npublicationoftheCMC,theReturnstoTrade,pro-
videsdetailedinformationontheexacttypeofgoodstraded,whichenablesus
ol-
lowing,wede?neallimportscategorisedunderthesamenameasasingle
good.
36
Table5summarisesthegrowthinthenumberofgoodsimportedto
Chinafrom1868to1947.
37
Thetableshowsthatthenumberofdifferentcottongoodsalmosttripledin
morethan25years(1868–94).Thereisalsoevidenceforthe‘destruction’of
goods:thenumberofdifferentwoollenproductsfallsfrom20to11overthe
sameperiod.
Overall,thenumberofdifferentimportsinChinarisesfrom80to483,or
6showsthecorresponding
evolutionoftheextensivemarginonChina’sexportside;here,theincreaseis
474percentforthesameperiod.
Howdothese?gurescomparewithotherevidence?BrodaandWeinstein
(2006)?ndthatovertheperiodof1972–2001,thenumberofnewimportsin
theUnitedStatesgrewby119percent,504per
centincreaseinimportvarietywehavecalculatedforChinaduringtheyears
1868and1947translatesintoarateofimportvarietygrowthof6.4percent
36
Thisde?nitionmayunderstatethegrowthintheextensivemargintotheextentthattheelasticity
ofsubstitutionforthesamegoodacrossexportersisnotin?heselines,Brodaand
Weinstein’s(2006)de?nitioncountsasanewgoodimportalsoimportsofanoldgoodfromanew
tthisapproachonlywhentheCMCexplicitlyassignedseparatenames.
Forexample,‘Drills,English’,‘Drills,Dutch’,and‘Drills,American’areregardedasthree
differentgoods.
37
Thenamesofgoodschangedoverthe80years,makingitpossiblethatthenameofonegoodin
nconcernisthatwelookatnomenclature
changes,ratherthanatanewgood,one
ofthereasonswhyweadoptaconservativede?com-
parethenumberofgoodsbelongingtoacertaingoodsgroupovertime,whichisrelativelyrobust
tonomenclaturechanges.
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
872
,
TABLE5
NumberofGoodsImported,byGroup,forthePeriod1868–1947
GroupYear
18681894
29
11
22
39
2
103
Cottongoods
Woollengoods
Metals
Sundries
Miscellaneouspiecegoods
Total
piecegoods,grey
piecegoods,whiteordyed
piecegoods,printed
piecegoods,miscellaneous
,raw;cottonyarnandcottonthread
manufactures,sundry
,ramie,hemp,juteandmanufacturesthereof
dmanufacturesthereof
dmanufacturesthereof
andores
eryandtools
esandvessels
laneousmetalmanufacturers
yandseaproducts
products,cannedgoodsandgroceries
sand?our
,seedsandvegetables
nalsubstancesandspices
,beer,spirits,tablewaters,etc.
o
alsandpharmaceuticals
,pigments,paintsandvarnishes
s,soap,oils,fats,waxes,gumsandresins
,maps,paperandwoodpulp
,leatherandotheranimalsubstances
,bamboos,rattans,coir,strawandmanufacturesthereof
,fuel,pitchandtar
are,enamelledware,glass,etc.
,earthandmanufacturesthereof
Total
11
20
19
30
0
80
1946–47
8
24
6
6
7
8
9
20
9
47
18
12
32
15
16
7
10
8
6
11
5
25
23
20
22
16
10
19
4
10
4
46
483
hatweadoptamoreconservativede?nitionofwhatconsti-
tutesanewgood,thissuggestsChina’sgoodsrangeduringtheCMCperiodat
ahigherratethantheUnitedStates’d
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
CHINA’SFOREIGNTRADE
TABLE6
NumberofGoodsExported,byGroup,forPeriod1868–1947
GroupYear
1868
Total
sandanimalproducts
,leatherandskins
yandseaproducts
ndpeas
sandcerealproducts
ffs,vegetable
,fresh,driedandpreserved
nalsubstancesandspices
,tallowandwax
uousbeverages
o
bles
egetableproducts
,woodandmanufacturesthereof
e?bres
,threadandplaitedandknittedgoods
oods
extileproducts
,metalsandmetallicproducts
ndglassware
,earth,sandandmanufacturesthereof
alsandchemicalproducts
dmatter
Total
62
1946–47
33
32
4
10
17
2
13
10
11
12
3
1
10
4
14
6
3
4
2
7
5
27
9
14
17
19
2
7
11
3
44
356
873
1894
64
bethattherangeofproductgrowthisinverselyrelatedtothetimesincetrade
opening,work
willhavetoexaminethisquestionfurther.
ng’sRoleinIntermediatingChina’sTrade
?
tforAsdemonstratedabove,HongKongplayedamajorroleasentrepo
China’stradeduringthenineteenthcentury,andrecentresearchsuggestsHong
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
874
,
FIGURE5
?
tforChina’sTrade,1865–1945HongKongasanEntrepo
0.5
ExportsImports
H
o
n
g
K
o
n
g
\'
s
s
h
a
r
e
o
f
C
h
i
n
a
\'
s
t
r
a
d
e
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
18601900
Year
19101950
Kongintermediatedabout50percentofChina’sexportsduringthe1990s
(FeenstraandHanson,2004).InformationfromtheCMCstatisticstogether
withtherecentdataforthe1990sgiveusHongKong’sshareintheChina
lowsustoexamineHongKong’s
?
t.
38
long-runroleasanentrepo
Figure5presentstheshareofHongKonginChina’sexportsandimports
age,HongKongaccountedforaboutaquarter
ofChina’ubstantial,this
imum,thissuggeststhat
tradeintermediationdoesnotnecessarilydeclineovertime,evenaseconomies
becomemoresophisticatedorcommunicationsystemsimprove.
Moreover,itisclearthattheimportanceofHongKongwasfarfromcon-
adpatternisoneofrisingsharesofbothimportsand
exportsduringthelast35yearsofthenineteenthcenturybeforebothdeclines
hat,HongKong’sroleinintermediating
exportsandimportsfollowsdifferenttrends:agrowingimportanceforexports,
withcloseto30percentbytheendoftheSecondWorldWar,whiletheshare
38
Anotherinterestingquestion,beyondthescopeofthispaper,ishowamajortrading?rmsuchas
LiandFungtodaycomparestothecompradors,ormiddlemen,oftheChinatradeinthenineteenth
century.
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
CHINA’SFOREIGNTRADE875
ound50per
centofChina’stradegoingthroughHongKonginthe1990s,thisimplieshuge
swingsfortheroleofHongKongasChina’stradeintermediary.
Onepossibleexplanationforthesechangesmaybethatestablishinginter-
nationaltradelinksrequirespayinga?xedcosttoacquireknowledgespe-
ci?case,tradeintermediationcanthrivebecauseitmay
notbeoptimalforagivenEuropeanexporter,forexample,toacquirethis
market-speci?cknowledgeindividually.
39
Alongtheselines,thedeclinein
intermediationfrom1895to1935couldbeattributedtothecumulative
mighthavereducedtheircostsofsellingdirectlyasopposedtothrough
intermediaries.
40
Therearetwopiecesofevidenceconsistentwiththeideathattheextentof
intermediationisaffectedby?,notethatrightafterthe
openingofthe?rst?veports,HongKong’sshareforimportsandexportsis
comparable(17percentand15percent,respectively,intheyear1865).How-
ever,inthefollowingyearstheimportshareclimbedmuchfasterthanthe
epointofviewofapotentialnewEuropeanexporterwith
limitedknowledgeofChina,HongKong(aBritishcolonysince1842)was
likelytobemoreaccessiblethanoneoftherecentlyopenedportsinQing
rast,fromthepointofviewofforeigntraders,itislesscrucial
forexportsfromChinatoEurope,JapanortheUnitedStatestobechannelled
ore,it
maynotbesurprisingthatHongKong’sshareofexportsislowerthanthatfor
importsandrisingmoreslowly.
Second,foranumberofyearstheCMCrecordedindetailtheultimateori-
atacanbe
combinedwithdataonChina’sdirectforeigntradetoexaminethedetermi-
?
6ashowsHongKong’ssharenantsofHongKong’sroleasanentrepo
ofallforeignimportstoChinaandHongKong,acrossexportersintheearly
saclearnegativerelationshipwiththesizeoftrade:countries
thatexportrelativelylittletoChinaandHongKong,suchasAustraliaorthe
Philippines,tendtoshipthroughHongKongwhereasbigtraderssuchasGreat
consistentwith?xed
39
Similarly,FeenstraandHanson(2004)argueforthe1990sthatHongKongtradersmayhavean
informationaladvantageintradebetweenChinaandtherestoftheworld,whichallowsthemto
(1999)presents
evidencethattransportcostsdonotaccountforalltheincreasesinthepriceastheypassthrough
?
o
40
Consistentwiththeideaofmarket-speci?clearning,theCMCnotedthatinitiallyWestern
exportersweresurprisedtonotbeabletoselllargequantitiesofknivesandforks,orpianofortesin
nineteenthcenturyChina(CMC,1933,p.39).
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
876
,
FIGURE6
?
ngasanEntrepo
(a)Imports;(b)Export
(a)
1
South Africa
Philippines
Australia
H
o
n
g
K
o
n
g
\'
s
s
h
a
r
e
o
f
i
m
p
o
r
t
s
0
.
8
Russia
Singapore
Dutch Indies
0
.
4
0
.
6
British India
Continental Europe
Great Britain
Japan
USA
0
4
(b)
1
Australia
0
.
8
South Africa
Philippines
Russia
Singapore
British India
0
.
2
6810
Imports of China plus Hong Kong (log)
12
Dutch Indies
H
o
n
g
K
o
n
g
\'
s
s
h
a
r
e
o
f
e
x
p
o
r
t
s
0
.
6
Continental Europe
0
.
4
USA
0
.
2
Great Britain
Japan
0
6810
Exports from China plus Hong Kong (log)
12
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
CHINA’SFOREIGNTRADE877
xportside,we?ndasimilarpatternalthough
notquiteasstrong(seeFigure6b).
The?guresshowthatseveralofthecountrieswithrelativelysmall
amountsoftradearelocatedneartoSouthEastAsiaandthusarecloserto
rolfortheimpactofrela-
tivelocation,ultsaregivenin
Table7.
Fromcolumn1,thevolumeoftradeaccountsfor54percentofthevaria-
tionintheshareoftradeintermediationofHongKongontheimportside.
WhileitisclearthatHongKong’ssharetendstobehigherthecloserexporting
nationsaretoHongKongrelativetoShanghai(fromcolumn2),theimpactof
sizeremainssigni?,theimpactofthevolumeoftradeonHong
Kong’sshareofintermediationisquantitativelyalmosttwicethatofdistance.
WhilevolumemattersalsoforHongKong’sshareofChina’sexports,the
effectisnotquiteasstrongasforimports,ascolumns3and4ofTable4
alysisprovidesempiricalsupportforthehypothesisthat
tradeintermediationisaffectedbythecostsofobtaininginformation,search,
andmatchingbetweenbuyersandsellers.
ThisanalysishasemphasisedthatHongKonghasbeenaparticularly
importantportforChina’
researchcantakeadvantageofHongKong’spositiontostudytheeconomics
oftradeintermediationinnosmallpartbecauseinformationonHongKong’s
tradewasrecordedseparatelyfromChina’sbecauseHongKongbelongedto
thetreatyportera,however,allof
China’stradewascollectedattheleveloftheport,ormorepreciselycustoms
station,andaswenotedabovethesewereincreasinglylocatedthroughout
China.
TABLE7
DeterminantsofIntermediationinTrade
ImportShare
Tradevolume
RelativedistancetoShanghai
R
2
p>F-stat
Betatrade
Betadistance
0.54
0.01
?0.112
(0.034)
?0.095
(0.033)
0.404
(0.234)
0.67
<0.01
?0.622
0.371
ExportShare
?0.113
(0.045)
0.33
0.03
?0.059
(0.026)
0.750
(0.077)
0.67
<0.01
?0.304
0.642
Notes:
Dependentvariable:HongKong’sshareofimportsinChinaplusHongKong’simports(columns1and2),
andHongKong’sshareofexportsofChinaplusHongKong’sexports(columns3and4).Tradevolumeis
logimports(exports)to(from)ChinaandHongKongincolumns1and2(3and4).Secondregressoristhe
standarderrorsinparentheses.N?11.
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
878
,
TABLE8
NewGoodsandNewPorts
RegionalDimensionCommodityDimension
ExistingGoodsNewGoods
B
D
Existingports
Newports
A
C
arginsandPortMarginsinChina’sTrade
OuranalysisabovehasshownthatthenumberofdifferentgoodsinChina’s
tensivemarginisdis-
tinguishedfromtheintensivemarginoftrade,whicharechangesinthetrade
rdimensionthatcanbeexaminedis
changesintradeatdifferentports,makingitpossibletoobservehowforeign
particularlyusefulwhencountries
arerelativelylargeorinterregionaltransportislimited,asinChinaduringthis
8depictsthesetwodimensionsoftrade.
Thefollowinganalysispresentssomeinitialevidenceontherelativeimpor-
tanceofthegoodsandportsdimensioninChina’stradefromtheCMC
lysisbeginsbyfocusingontheforeigntradeofaparticular
economy(?rstrowinTable8,cellsAandB)ationon
Chinesetradeduringthetreatyporteracanbeemployedtoshedadditional
lightontheavailabilityofspeci?ccommoditiesinadditionalregionsofChina
(cellsCandDinTable8).
iveandExtensiveMargininShanghai
We?rstturntoimportsatShanghai,themostimportantChineseportduring
thetreatyportera,foraparticularcottongood,‘ShirtingsandSheetings,Grey’,
asanexampleoftheintensivemarginforagivenregion(cellA).
41
Figure7a
showstheimportquantitiesof‘ShirtingsandSheetings,Grey’toShanghai
from1869to1920.
42
Thequantityofimportsdidnotvarymuchinthe?rst
twodecades(1869–89).Therewasadramaticincreasearound1905,when
importsnearlytripled,beforecollapsingtoaboutone?arp
41
,itwasasigni?canttradedgood
throughouttheCMCera,beingassigned‘No.1,Group1’inthecommodityclassi?cationsystem
,itisarelativelyhomogenousproduct,andchangesinitsquantitytend
tobecausedbychangesinimportedvolume,ratherthanchangesinimportedvarietieswithinthe
category.
42
Formanycommodities,?gureshowsnet
imports,namely,thequantitylocallyconsumed.
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
CHINA’SFOREIGNTRADE
FIGURE7
Shanghai’sTradeattheIntensiveMargin.(a)ImportsofGrey
ShirtingsandSheetings;(b)-yearMoving
AverageShown
(a)
3,000,000
879
2,500,000
2,000,000
P
i
e
c
e
s
1,500,000
1,000,000
500,000
0
1
8
6
9
1
8
7
1
1
8
7
3
1
8
7
5
1
8
7
7
1
8
7
9
1
8
8
1
1
8
8
3
1
8
8
5
1
8
8
7
1
8
8
9
1
8
9
1
1
8
9
3
1
8
9
5
1
8
9
7
1
8
9
9
1
9
0
1
1
9
0
3
1
9
0
5
1
9
0
7
1
9
0
9
1
9
1
1
1
9
1
3
1
9
1
5
1
9
1
7
1
9
1
9
Year
(b)
25,000
20,000
P
e
c
u
l
s
15,000
10,000
5000
0
1
8
6
9
1
8
7
1
1
8
7
3
1
8
7
5
1
8
7
7
1
8
7
9
1
8
8
1
1
8
8
3
1
8
8
5
1
8
8
7
1
8
8
9
1
8
9
1
1
8
9
3
1
8
9
5
1
8
9
7
1
8
9
9
1
9
0
1
1
9
0
3
1
9
0
5
1
9
0
7
1
9
0
9
1
9
1
1
1
9
1
3
1
9
1
5
1
9
1
7
1
9
1
9
Year
la-
nationmaybethatdomesticproductionsubstitutedforShanghai’simports.
Forothercommodities,7bshows
Shanghai’revaluesfor
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
880
,
FIGURE8
-YearMovingAverageShown
70
No. of silk
good
varieties
exported
18
16
14
12
Number of silk goods export varieties
60
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
c
o
t
t
o
n
g
o
o
d
s
i
m
p
o
r
t
v
a
r
i
e
t
i
e
s
50
40
10
8
6
30
20
4
10
No. of oncotto
goodtypesgood varieties
imported
1
8
7
1
1
8
7
2
1
8
7
3
1
8
7
4
1
8
7
5
1
8
7
6
1
8
7
7
1
8
7
8
1
8
7
9
1
8
8
0
1
8
8
1
1
8
8
2
1
8
8
3
1
8
8
4
1
8
8
5
1
8
8
6
1
8
8
7
1
8
8
8
1
8
8
9
1
8
9
0
1
8
9
1
1
8
9
2
1
8
9
3
1
8
9
4
2
0
0
Year
cocoonsthatwereproducedinthelocalShanghaieconomy(referredtoas
‘originalexports’intheCMCpublications).Asinthecaseofthespeci?c
cottongoodimports,thevolumeofsilkcocoonexportswerequitestablefor
n1895and1930,however,Shanghai’sexportsfor
thisgoodquadrupelled.
WehaveshownabovethatthenumberofproductvarietiesthatChina
i-
mationonport-levelactivitymakesitpossibletostudytheavailabilityofnew
goodsataregionallevelaswell(cellBinTable8).Speci?cally,Figure8
showsthatthenumberofsilkgoodvarietiesexportedfromShanghaiincreased
substantiallybetween1871and1894(rightscale).Moreover,thenumberof
cottongoodvarietiesimportedoverthesameperiodalmosttripled(left
scale).
43
ThisisthesameorderofmagnitudeasforChinaasawhole(see
Table5),consistentwiththeideathatmanyofthegoodsthatwerenewto
Chinawereintroduced?rstinShanghai.
43
ThescaleinFigure8isnotcomparabletothatofTable5,becauseShanghai’sgoodsclassi?ca-
tionismoredisaggregatedthanthatforChinaasawhole.
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
CHINA’SFOREIGNTRADE
iveGrowthThroughMorePorts
881
Theextenttowhichaparticulargoodbecomesavailableinmoreandmore
thequantityofimportsofGrey
FIGURE9
TheGrowthofTradeThroughNewPorts.(a)ImportsofGrey
CottonShirtingsandSheetings;(b)-YearMoving
AverageShown
(a)
10,000
9000
8000
P
i
e
c
e
s
I
m
p
o
r
t
e
d
(
0
0
0
s
)
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
395971899
ShanghaiNationNumber of ports
25
20
15
10
5
0
40
35
30
Number of open ports
(b)
14,000
12,000
10,000
25
23
21
19
Number of ports
P
e
c
u
l
s
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
1
8
7
8
1
8
8
1
1
8
8
4
1
8
8
7
1
8
6
9
1
8
7
0
1
8
7
1
1
8
7
2
1
8
7
3
1
8
7
4
1
8
7
5
1
8
7
6
1
8
7
7
1
8
7
9
1
8
8
0
1
8
8
2
1
8
8
3
1
8
8
5
1
8
8
6
1
8
8
8
1
8
8
9
1
8
9
0
1
8
9
1
17
15
13
Shanghai
Year
ChinaNumber of CMC Ports
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
882
,
ShirtingsandSheetingsinShanghaitogetherwithnationalimportsofthe
samegoodfortheperiod1869–y,Shanghai’simportsdonotchange
reaseinChina’s
importsisbecauseoftheopeningofadditionaltreatyports,whichwentfrom
rtothisastheportintensivemarginof
trade.
ThegrowthofexportsofSilkCocoonsisalsoinpartowingtotheport
margin,reaseinthe
numberofopenportsbetween1875and1877didnotmuchaffectthenumber
ofSilkCocoonsexportedbyChinabeyondchangesinShanghai’
contrast,thenewportsinthelate1880saddedsubstantiallytoChineseSilk
ybeexplainedbynewportsloweringlocalproducers’
costsofexporting.
rowthwithNewGoodsandNewPorts
Figure10ashowsthatbetween1870and1885,thereisamoderategrowth
inthenumberofcottongoodsvarietiesimportedbyShanghaiwhilethe
nationalnumberofcottongoodsvarietiesis?becauseatagiven
pointintimetheCMCportstatisticsaremoredisaggregatedthanthe
nationalstatistics,sothattheincreaseinproductvarietyattheportlevel
doesnotnecessarilyshowup.
44
Oncethenumberofdifferentcottonpiece
goodsimportedinShanghaibeginstoincreasemorerapidly,nationalstatis-
ticsalsorecordavarietyincrease(aftertheyear1885).Itisreasonableto
assumethatthetradeofShanghaibroughtaboutthegreatervarietyofgoods
tenthannot,Shanghailedintermsofimporting
supportedby
thefactthatShanghai’simportvarietiesdeclinedin1891butoverallChinese
importvarietiesdidnotdeclineaccordingly–theimportsofnewvarietiesby
otherports,oncestarted,wouldnolongerbeaffectedbywhetherShanghai
end–Shanghaileadingthenation–isnot
re10b,thesustained
increaseinthenumberofnationalvarietiesbetween1886and1889comesat
atimewhenthenumberofvarietiesexportedbyShanghaiisnotchanging
much.
44
Overtime,thenationalstatisticscaughtupwiththeportlevelclassi?ayedadjust-
mentexplainswellthefactthatinFigure10aimportvarietiestoShanghaistartedtorisearound
1884,butnationalimportvarietiesdidnotriseaccordinglyuntil1886,exactlythemomentwhen
thenumberofportsrosesigni?cantly.
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
CHINA’SFOREIGNTRADE
FIGURE10
NewGoodsandNewPortsintheLateNineteenthCentury.
(a)ImportsofCottonGoods;(b)-Year
MovingAveragesShown
(a)
30
25
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
o
p
e
n
p
o
r
t
s
20
15
883
70
60
50
40
30
Number of cotton goods varieties
10
5
0
1
8
8
7
1
8
8
8
1
8
9
0
1
8
9
2
1
8
7
2
1
8
7
5
1
8
7
7
1
8
8
0
1
8
7
1
1
8
7
3
1
8
7
4
1
8
7
6
1
8
7
8
1
8
7
9
1
8
8
1
1
8
8
2
1
8
8
3
1
8
8
4
1
8
8
5
1
8
8
6
1
8
8
9
1
8
9
1
1
8
9
3
1
8
9
4
20
10
0
No. of ports
(b)
Nation No. of varietiesShanghai No. of varieties -- net imports
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1
8
7
1
1
8
7
2
1
8
7
3
1
8
7
4
1
8
7
5
1
8
7
6
1
8
7
8
1
8
7
9
1
8
8
1
1
8
8
2
1
8
8
3
1
8
8
4
1
8
8
5
1
8
8
6
1
8
8
8
1
8
8
9
1
8
9
1
1
8
9
2
1
8
9
3
1
8
7
7
1
8
8
0
1
8
8
7
1
8
9
0
1
8
9
4
30
25
Number of open ports
20
15
10
5
0
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
s
i
l
k
g
o
o
d
v
a
r
i
e
t
i
e
s
e
x
p
o
r
t
e
d
Shanghai No. of varieties
Year
Nation No. of varieties
No. of ports
’SFOREIGNTRADESINCE1949
Theoveralleconomicsystemafter1949wasmodelledaftertheSoviet
Unionandraisedsavingsfromtheruralsectortobene?tindustrialproduction
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
884
,
(Naughton,2007;BrandtandRawski,2008).Foreigntradewasgenerallycon-
ductedbystateenterprisesthathadlimitedincentivestooperateef?ciently
becausetheirpositionwasnotcontestedbycompetition.
45
Theoverallregime
adoptedbyChinawasgearedtowardsself-suf?ciencyandimportsubstitution,
whichassuchwasnotatypicalforarelativelypoorcountryduringthisperiod.
Nevertheless,China’sowntraderegimetogetherwiththetradeliberalisations
oftheGATT
46
membercountriesmeantthatChina’sroleinworldtrade
eforetheSecondWorldWarChinaaccountedfor
around2percentoftheworld’simportsplusexports(seeTable3above),
estimatessuggestthatChina’ssharehadfallenbythe1950stoaround1.7per
centandbythe1970stoaround0.7percent(Lardy,1994,p.2).
QuantitativeinformationonChina’sforeigntradeduringtheperiod1949–79
andsinstarkcontrasttothetreatyportera,butitcorre-
spondstothesmallnetgainsthatChinawasexpectingtoreapfromparticipa-
ntradedatawerecollected,asinmostother
countries,intheprocessofadministeringtradetaxesthroughcustoms.
However,mple,datacollectionwas
discontinuedduringtheyearsoftheCulturalRevolution(1966–78).Moreover,
tesofChina’sforeigntrade,
bothattheaggregateandcommoditylevel,havebeenmadebyvariousana-
lystsbasedoninformationfromChina’stradingpartners,fromstatistical
sourcescompiledbytheUN,theOECDandothercountries.
47
Thesedatasuggestanaverageannualgrowthrateforthevalueofimports
between1952and1964of4percent,whileexportsgrewat6percent.
48
Tradegrowthacceleratedsubsequently,withannualrealexportgrowthof12.9
percentperyearforexportsand12.3percentforimportsbetween1970and
1978.
49
Fortheearlierpost-SecondWorldWarperiod,Figures11aand11b
showmajorcommoditiesthatChinaimportedandexported,respectively.
50
45
TheStatePlanningCommissioncontrolledtheamountsthatcouldbeimportedandexported,
andthegreatmajorityofcommoditiesweretradedthroughalimitednumberof?rmsownedand
tion,thereweresharpgeographicandproduc-
tiondivisionsinof?cialregulationsgoverningwhich?
traderegimewaspermittedfor?rmsengagedinexportprocessing,butdomesticenterprises
,private?rmsengagedininternationaltradeinthe
transitionalperioduntilthemid-1950s(Fukaoetal.,2006).
46
GATTstandsforGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade,foundedin1947tomanagethepost-
SecondWorldWarsystemofinternationaltrade.
47
Anumberofestimates,includingthosebytheJapaneseInstituteofDevelopmentEconomics
andtheUSCentralIntelligenceService,arecomparedinFukaoetal.(2006).
48
Nominalvalues,fromFukaoetal.(2006,TablesA1andA2).
49
Nominalvalueoftradein$US,fromFukaoetal.(2006,Table2;CIA?gures);conversionto
realgrowthusingUSconsumerpriceindices(CPI)fromtheUSBureauofLaborStatistics.
50
Thelistedcommoditiesaccountforabout50percentofChina’simportsand40percentof
China’sexports.
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
CHINA’SFOREIGNTRADE
FIGURE11
China’sTradebyCommodity,1952and1964.
(a)MajorImports;(b)Exports
(a)
0.35
0.3
S
h
a
r
e
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
i
m
p
o
r
t
s
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
1952
Cereals, Cereal Prep.
Iron and Steel
(b)
1958
Textile fibresFertilizers, manuf\'d
1964
885
Machinery, non-electr.
0.2
0.18
0.16
S
h
a
r
e
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
e
x
p
o
r
t
s
0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
19521958
Year
Cereals, Cereal Prep.
Textile yarns, fabrics
Fruits & Vegetables
Non-electric machinery
Oil seeds, oil nuts
Clothing
1964
Overtheyears1952–64,produceaswellasseedsandnutsbecamelessimpor-
tantexportarticles,andChinaswitchedfrombeinganetexportertoimporter
sevidenceforverticalspecialisationinformofanincreasing
shareoftextile?breimportsatthesametimewhenthetextilefabricsand
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
886
,
salsosubstantialintra-industrytrade
forsomeproducts,forexamplethenonelectricalmachinerysector.
oilpriceshocksandtheensuingworldrecessiontogetherwithstillhighstatutory
tariffratesthroughoutthe1980scontributedtoaslowdownofChina’strade
growthbetween1981and1987,whenimportsgrewatanannualrateof10.4per
centandexportswith5.2percentonaverage.
51
Comparedtoothercountries,how-
ever,12showsChina’sshareintheworld’stotal
exportsandimportsofgoodsandservicesfrom1970to2007.
52
China’sshareinworldtradedidnotchangemuchbetween1970and1978,while
after1978China’sshareincreasedsubstantially,consistentwithatradeliberalising
reakpointsinFigure12occuraround1990and
around2000,andineachcasetherateatwhichChinagainsintermsofherworld
tradeshareincreased,withChina’srateoftradegrowthincreasingoverallduring
n1978and1990,tradegrowthis7.5percent,between1990
and2000itcomesto13.5percent,andbetween2000and2007itis16.2percent.
53
AnimportanteventthatstrengthenedChina’sforeigntradetiesfurtherisitsacces-
siontotheWorldTradeOrganisationin2001.
Despitetheseimpressiveincreases,onlyin1994didChinasurpassitsshare
ofworldtradeinthemid-1920s(2.3percent,seeTable3).Thissuggeststhat
successoverthelastseveraldecadesmaybelessexceptional,andmore‘back
tonormal’usfarunclearwhatthelong-run
shareofChinaintheworld’gure12,wecan
ruleoutthatitis2.3percent,thevaluein1925,becauseby2007China’s
sharehasreachedalmost7percent,,
in2008China’sshareinworldmerchandisetradeaccountedforcloseto8per
cent,rankedthirdintheworldaftertheUnitedStatesandGermany,although
intermediategoodstradeplaysalargerroleforChinathanfortheothertwo
countries.
54
Economicallyspeaking,1925isimplausiblebecauseatthetimeChinawas
onlystartingtoindustrialisewhereaslargepartsofEurope,NorthAmericaand
a-
tivelylongperiodof70yearsthatittookuntilChina’sworldtradeshare
revertedbacktoits1925valuemayalsobeasignoftheseverityofChina’s
hiatusintermsofforeigntradeduringtheperiodfrom1949until1978.
51
52
Fukaoetal.(2006,Table2;CIAestimates),combinedwithUSCPI.
Source:WorldDevelopmentIndicators(WDI),TheWorldBank.
53
FromWDI,exportsandimportsinconstant$2000.
54
SeeKoopmanetal.(2008),FeenstraandWei(2010).Thelattervolumealsocoversin-depth
analysesofthecausesandconsequencesofChina’sveryrecenttrade,whichwewillnotrepeat
ptersinFeenstraandWei(2010)examinealsoChina’sinwardandoutwardFDI,
macroeconomicdimensions,aswellaspolicyaspects.
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
CHINA’SFOREIGNTRADE
FIGURE12
China’sShareinWorldTrade,1970–2007
0.07
887
0.06
C
h
i
n
a
\'
s
s
h
a
r
e
i
n
w
o
r
l
d
t
r
a
d
e
(
e
x
p
o
r
t
s
+
i
m
p
o
r
t
s
)
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
6
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
1
9
7
2
1
9
8
6
1
9
9
4
Year
DINGDISCUSSION
China’sforeigntradeoverthelast150yearshasevolvedinsomebroad
as?rsttherestrictivestanceoftheQinggovernmentwhichwas
liftedunderpressurefromWesterngunboatsinthemid-nineteenthcentury.
Aftertheyear1949,thetidemovedagainstforeigntradeagainintheformof
restrictivepoliciesbecauseoftheColdWar,beforegeneralpoorperformance
ofthecentrally-plannedeconomyledtoanotherroundoftradeopeningaspart
ly,Chinawasforcedtoopenitseconomyto
othcases,foreigntradeincreasedsoon
afterliberalisation.
EmployingrichinformationonChina’sforeigntradeduringthetreatyport
,therewasa
strongexpansioninproductdiversity,withmanynewgoodsbeingimported
,informationonport-leveltradeenablesustodocument
theregionaldiffusionofforeigngoodsthroughChina,whichweshowwas
,theimportanceof
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
6
0
888
,
HongKongasanintermediaryinChina’stradehasundergonelong-term?uc-
tuations,andHongKongisalsodisproportionatelyusedbyrelativelysmall
traders;theseresultssupporttheexistenceoflearninginthepresenceofsome
?xedcostsoftrade.
China’stradegrowthduringthelastthreedecadesistosomeextentthe?ip
sideoftheseveretradedepressionduring1949–clipsedher1920s
highinworldtradebytheearly1990s,
China’sindustrialisationispartoftheexplanation,itisimportanttounderstand
lowingwill
approachthisbyconsideringChina’stradeopennessthroughthelensof
history.
Largecountriestendtobelessopentotradethansmallercountries,notleast
13ashowstheexport-
to-GDPratio,ourmeasureoftradeopenness,versustheshareoftheworld
sanegative
andstrongrelationshipbetweencountrysizeandopenness(R
2
of0.74).Itmay
notbesurprisingthatChina?tsthegeneralpatterninFigure13abecausethe
nineteenth-centuryopeningofChinawasaformofcolonisationinwhich
Westernpowersimposedtheirinstitutionsoftrade,therebytriggeringinstitu-
tionalchangeinChinathatmayhavemadeitsimilartothemostlyWestern
(-in?uenced)countriesshowninthe?gure.
55
Repeatingthisanalysisfortheyear2006,almostthreedecadesafter
China’smostrecenttradeopening,13b
showsthatChina’stradeopennessnowisveryhigh–andgivenitssize,
thinkofChina’ssubstantialprocessingtrade–
whichraisesexportsbutnotGDP–butChinaishighlyopenevencom-
paredtoothercountrieswithhigherprocessingtrade,suchasMexico.
56
China’sopennesstodayisclosertoDenmark’sthantoMexico’s,whichis
remarkablegiventhatthereareroughly250ChineseforeveryoneDanein
theworld.
IfChina’seconomytodayisextraordinarilyopentotrade,thisconstitutesa
velylittleisknownabouthowChinahas
rework,wewillemployport-levelinformationon
theregionaldistributionofChina’sinternalandexternaltradeasitwasshaped
duringthetreatyporteratobetterunderstandtheprocessofintegrationinto
theworldeconomy,n-
erally,webelievethatfurtherresearchontheinteractionoftheinstitutional
legacyfromcolonisationandChina’sforeigntradewillshednewlightona
numberofimportantdevelopmentissues.
55
56
SeeNunn(2007)andLevchenko(2007)forrecentworkontheroleofinstitutionsfortrade.
Koopmanetal.(2008)andFeenstraandWei(2010)examineChina’sprocessingtrade.
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
CHINA’SFOREIGNTRADE889
FIGURE13
ForeignTradeOpennessVersusShareofWorldPopulation.(a)Year1913;(b)Year2006
(a)
4
South Africa
3
Argentina
Australia
Egypt
Denmark
Sweden
E
x
p
o
r
t
s
t
o
G
D
P
r
a
t
i
o
(
l
o
g
)
Brazil
Great Britain
Germany
2
Mexico
Japan
US
India
1
China
0
–6–4–20
Share of world population (log)
(b)
4
Sweden
Denmark
Germany
China
E
x
p
o
r
t
s
t
o
G
D
P
r
a
t
i
o
(
l
o
g
)
3
.
5
Mexico
Great Britain
Egypt
South Africa
India
3
Australia
Japan
Argentina
2
.
5
US
–7–6–5–4–3
Share of world population (log)
–2
–1
Brazil
?2011BlackwellPublishingLtd.
890
,
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